In the ongoing mass arrests in Bangladesh, nearly 20,000 people have been put behind bars. These arrests started on May 28, 2008 after the ban on political activity was lifted. It was expected that after allowing political activity, the government will facilitate the electoral process leading to the holding of elections which were postponed in January 2007. But the mass arrests in the name of deteriorating law and order condition have made the political situation fluid.
The claim of declining law and order has been promptly refuted by the Inspector General of Police (IGP) Nur Mohammad. He in fact stated that the arrests across the country was a regular affair and launched with a view to further improve the situation. He also claimed that no 'wholesale arrest' is being made. The police chief's comment contradicted that of the Home Adviser, who earlier defended the ongoing countrywide arrests as an operation to check the deterioration of law and order ahead of the elections.
The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) has asked its leaders and cadres to prepare for an agitation. It appears that the release of Khaleda has become doubtful and the BNP is preparing for this upcoming battle in this regard with the caretaker government. The mass arrests are probably meant to blunt the edges of this agitation. The BNP-led four-party alliance, which faced some difficulty after the end of its term, has once again come together. After almost two years, the situation is nearly the same as it was in October 2006 when power was handed over to the first caretaker government.
Apart from the arrests, another development which may have a bearing on the murky political situation in the country deserves to be noted. Bangladesh Army Chief, General Moeen, removed two top-ranking generals from key positions. Principal Staff Officer (PSO) Lieutenant General Masud Uddin Ahmed Chowdhury, considered the second most powerful person in the military, was initially transferred to a low-key post of Commandant of the National Defence College. Within days, however, he was shifted to the foreign ministry. Major General Abdul Mubin, General Officer Commanding of 24 Infantry Division based in Chittagong, was appointed as the new PSO. While NDC Commandant Lieutenant General Abu Tayab Mohammad Zahirul Alam has been appointed as the new Bangladesh envoy to Australia, the area commander of the northeastern Bogra was transferred to replace Mubin in Chittagong. Masud Uddin Ahmed Chowdhury and Zahirul Alam were among the four senior generals whose positions were upgraded in May 2007.
Lieutenant General Masud Uddin Ahmed Chowdhury was the most powerful person in Bangladesh Army after General Moeen. He had held the crucial command of Nine Infantry Division based in suburban Savar during last year's proclamation of the state of emergency and installation of the current interim government. Moreover, he is also a relative of Begum Khaleda Zia. There was a possibility that Generals like him could have gone against Moeen. The reshuffle in the top brass of the army may have been brought about to pre-empt this possibility. It will also consolidate the hold of General Moeen. The changes came two months after President Iajuddin Ahmed extended the tenure of Army Chief General Moeen U Ahmed by a year.
In the political circles of Bangladesh and in the media there is also talk of a national government. Given the track record of political parties in Bangladesh the proposal of a national government may not be such a bad idea. There seems to be a general agreement that the actions taken by the caretaker government have been for the betterment of the country. The only thing that the public now desires is that the same approach be continued under a democratic government, so that their political rights are also protected. In this effort, the national government could be a middle path between a democratic government and a military-backed caretaker government.
There has also been talk of a “National Charter.” But the Awami League and BNP leaders have opposed any move by the caretaker government to formulate such a charter. If both mainstream political parties were to accept the national charter, it will mean that they have accepted all the actions of the caretaker government as legitimate and justified, something that they would not like to do.
The proposal of a national unity government was suggested by the Gono Forum leaders. They also proposed a review of the constitution. In their pre-poll dialogue with the caretaker government, they felt that a post-election national unity government would ensure a non-partisan commitment to good governance. They also proposed a four-point set of reforms including removal of black money, violence, militancy and partisan state mechanisms to ensure that the next elections are free, fair and credible.
The caretaker government’s rule in Bangladesh is entering a very important phase. They are under domestic and international pressure to hold the elections and hand over power. The political dialogue has started and a parallel dialogue is being held with members of the civil society. But this has so far not helped to sort out issues with the two main political parties in Bangladesh, whose participation is very important for holding a credible election. The caretaker government cannot succeed in its minus-two theory. Everything would thus depend on what conditions of the caretaker government Hasina and Khalida accept.
The civil society of Bangladesh including its business leaders are also in a dilemma. They do want elections, but neither do they want to go back to a chaotic and confrontational political climate. They want an election which will result in a smooth transition of power. In the prevailing conditions where a stalemate has been reached between the caretaker government and the two mainstream political parties, a solution is possible only if both sides show some flexibility in their stated positions. A rigid stand would lead the country towards political chaos. Most importantly, a breakthrough has to come soon as the elections announced are due in December 2008.
On June 2, terrorists exploded a car-bomb outside the Embassy of Denmark in the high-security diplomatic area of Islamabad. The explosion instantaneously killed eight people, injured more than twenty five and damaged properties in the vicinity. People killed in the attack were mainly Pakistanis, including the local staff at the embassy and a Danish citizen of Pakistani origin. It is not clear how an explosive-laden car was able to enter such a highly-guarded area without detection. Pakistani authorities have already formed a joint investigation team including the police, investigating and intelligence agencies. The Danish Foreign Ministry has also formed a task force and has sent a team to Islamabad to co-ordinate with Pakistani authorities.
The attack has to be seen in the context of developments in Denmark over the last few years and the international repercussions of these events. Foremost among these relates to the issue of the cartoons depicting Prophet Mohammed in a provocative form. Pakistan was one of the countries that experienced massive street demonstrations against these cartoons. With the reprinting of these cartoons in Danish media in February 2008 as a symbolic protest against the alleged plot to kill the cartoonist, the situation has once again become tense. In mid-April, the Centre for Terroranalyse (CTA) under the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) made the following assessment:
“The reprinting of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed has led to a renewed negative focus on Denmark in a number of countries. There are indications that the reprinting has led to an increased focus on Denmark – also among leading militant extremist abroad – and that such extremists wish to carry out acts of terrorism against Denmark, Danes and Danish interests abroad. This particularly applies to Danes and Danish interests in areas where al-Qaida-related groups are active; with emphasis on countries in North Africa and the Middle East and in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Terrorist attacks can take place without prior intelligence indications, i.e. without warning.
There is much speculation about who is actually behind the attack, especially given the new Pakistan government’s truce with local extremist groups in South Waziristan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The needle of suspicion seems to point towards al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Pakistan. Interestingly, the PET, in its preliminary assessment, has underscored the probability of al-Qaeda and its affiliates behind the attack. However, it has not ruled out the intention of ‘other militant Islamist groups and network in Pakistan’. Even if it is presumed that global terrorist groups – who are known for their precise planning and flawless execution – are behind the attack, it also has to be accepted that they have chosen the target indiscriminately knowing very well that the attack would only kill fellow Muslims and not Danes who have already shifted from the targeted premises. Given the indiscriminate nature of the attack, it is possible that individually radicalised persons or group of persons may be behind the attack.
Individually inspired groups or lone radicals have gained a clear significance in the present global terror scenario. It is obvious that the Danish cartoon controversy has contributed to a quick radicalisation process of Muslim youth in Pakistan and elsewhere. Some incidents may especially be cited here. In March 2006, Amir Abdur Rehman Cheema, a Pakistani national from Saroki in Punjab who had been studying textile engineering in Mönchengladbach, Germany, attempted to kill the editor of Die Welt in the newspaper’s office in Berlin. Cheema wanted to avenge the ‘sacrilege’ in the form of cartoons reprinted by Die Welt in solidarity with Jyllands-Posten, the Danish daily from Aarhus which first published the cartoons. Apprehended and placed in custody, Cheema committed suicide in a Berlin prison in May 2006. In protest, a huge demonstration took place during Cheema’s funeral in his home town. Some parliamentarians of the MMA even tabled a motion in the Pakistan National Assembly to discuss the incident. Similarly, in 2006, two students were arrested in Germany for attempting to plant suitcase bombs at the railway stations of Dortmund and Koblenz. The two Lebanese students were supposedly angered by the publication of the Danish cartoons in the European media. In February 2008, Danish authorities claimed to have arrested two Tunisians and a Danish national who wanted to kill Kurt Westergaard, a cartoonist of Jyllands-Posten.
As the investigations are at a preliminary stage and both Danish and Pakistani authorities have declared to work together, findings would be indeed crucial for terrorism experts and security analysts. Nonetheless the attack against the Danish embassy in Islamabad is not all that surprising. Since the publication and reprinting of the provocative Danish cartoons, its consequence in different parts of the world has indeed been a matter of global concern. The whole issue has had a severe impact on Denmark’s relations with Arab countries and with those countries with significant Muslim populations in South and South East Asia. It appears at present that the cartoon controversy would continue to haunt Danes at home as well as abroad. Moreover, given that Danish soldiers are posted in Afghanistan, Danish foreign and security policy is likely to face unprecedented challenges in the months to come.
ABOUT THE BOOK
For the last five decades artificial satellites are being used to perform diverse roles in astronomy, atmospheric studies and education. They have been found useful for reconnaissance, meteorology, navigation, communication and search & rescue.
Space technologies are offering benefits to space faring nations and space derived products are available at a price. Space is also been seen as the ultimate high ground and gives armies and space faring nations tremendous advantage on the battlefield. After the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007, the global community has now become more concerned about the likely weaponisation of space.
With these aspects as a backdrop, this book Space Security and Global Cooperation is a collection of papers that were presented at the Space Security Conference organised by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi and the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, London. The book covers a wide spectrum of issues related to the field of space security, emerging technologies, regional perspectives, space tourism, space law and global cooperation. It is an attempt to contextualise the debates in a more cogent form.
ABOUT THE EDITORS
Wg. Cdr. Ajey Lele is an Air Force officer currently working with IDSA as a Research Fellow. His research interests include: space security, strategic technologies and WMDs. He holds a PhD from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and has done his masters in Physics from Pune University. He has authored two books and published articles in various journals, newspapers and websites.
Gunjan Singh is a Researcher at IDSA. She has completed her M. Phil from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and is currently pursuing her PhD. Her research interests include: China, disarmament and space law.
CONTENTS IN DETAIL
About the Editors/Contributors
Preface
Introduction
Section I: Global Overview
- Can Space Cooperation Lead to Space Security? — A.P.J. Abdul Kalam
- The Emerging World Space Order: An Indian Perspective
— K. Kasturirangan - US National Security Space — Joseph Rouge
- A Code of Conduct for Responsible: Space-faring Nations — Michael Krepon
- Strategic Space, a Variable-Geometry Concept — Isabelle Sourbès-Verger
- Strategic Space — Raja Menon
- The Use of Outer Space for Security and Defence: The European Perspective — Thomas Beer
- Space and the Israeli Experience: Geography, Technology, Security
— S. Samuel C. Rajiv - Remote Sensing and Earth Observation Satellites: Space Cooperation and Space Security — Amitav Mallik
- A Note on Earth Observation Satellites — K. Santhanam
- Space Security and Competition for Radio Frequencies and Geostationary Slots — Ram Jakhu and Karan Singh
- Satellite Earth Observation for Monitoring International Security Regimes — Masami Onoda
- EU Cooperation in Space and Security and the Way Ahead
— Tomaz Lovrencic - Small Satellites: Their Emerging Role in International Space Security
— Martin Sweeting - India’s SATNAV Programme: GAGAN and IRNSS — Suresh Kibe
- Space-based Signal Intelligence Systems: Global Trends and Technologies
— Sreehari Rao - Space Exploration: A Measure of American Collaboration — Chris Shank
- Space Security: Legal Implications — Ranjana Kaul
- A Proxy to Space Security Measures: Possibility of Soft Law Rules in International Space Law — Setsuko Aoki
- The US Industry Perspective — Alan Merbaum
- Space Industry and Promising Technologies — Ajey Lele
Section II: Strategic Space
Section III: Space Cooperation
Section IV: Emerging Space Technology
Section V: Space Law and Future Issue
Section VI: Space Industry
Appendix I: Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects: Draft
Appendix II: 1979 United Nations Moon Treaty
Index
CONTRIBUTORS
:
Setsuko Aoki is a Professor at the Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University, Japan, and also a member of Telecommunications Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MICj).
Thomas Beer is with the Security Strategy and Partnership Development Office, European Space Agency (ESA), Paris.
Isaac Ben-Israel is Chairman, Israel Space Agency.
Ram Jakhu is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
A.P.J. Abdul Kalam is former President of India.
K. Kasturirangan is the Director of the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) and former Chairman, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).
Ranjana Kaul is partner Dua Associates, New Delhi.
Suresh Kibe is the Programme Director of SATNAV, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).
Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia.
Tomaz Lovrencic is the Deputy Director, European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), Madrid, Spain.
Amitav Mallik is a former member of National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), and Director Defence Science Centre, New Delhi.
Alan Merbaum is the Sr. Manager, Air and Missile Defense Systems, Lockheed Martin Missiles & Fire Control, Dallas, Texas.
Raja Menon is a retired Rear Admiral and currently the Chairman of the Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation in the National Security Council, India Masami Onoda is a Research Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science/Kyoto University.
S. Samuel C. Rajiv is a Researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.
Sreehari Rao is the Director of Defence Electronics Research Laboratory, Hyderabad.
Joseph Rouge is Director, National Security Space Office, Department of Defence (DoD), USA.
Krishnamurthy Santhanam is the former Director General, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi.
Chris Shank is the Director of Strategic Investments, NASA, USA.
Karan Singh is a researcher at the Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
Isabelle Sourbes-Verger is senior researcher at the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), France and a member of the European Space Policy Research and Academic Network (ESPRAN).
Sir Martin Sweeting is the CEO and founder of the University owned spin-off company, Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL), United Kingdom.
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Recent announcements of major arms acquisition programmes by the Indian government must have given a sense of elation to the armed forces, which have been waiting for long for some of this equipment. These announcements also give greater confidence to the nation about the military’s capability to tackle national security challenges. But there are other long term implications of arms procurement largely through import.
India faces the dilemma of choosing to depend entirely on indigenous military production or resorting to import to meet its security challenges. The country has vast land borders, extended sea lanes and neighbours who are not so friendly. Given its size and location, it is expected to play a crucial role in the region. On the other hand, the domestic defence industry, though sufficiently large, is relatively weak and inefficient particularly in the context of fast changing defence technology. The resultant gap needs to be filled essentially by import of hi-tech defence equipment. But there are inherent problems with import of weapons and equipment.
The first and immediate problem associated with the import of arms is that it does not readily address the country’s long-term security needs. It is agreed that these procurements are expected to be futuristic in nature. However, even security calculations cannot accurately predict the future. Potential adversaries are unlikely to stick to the script and may acquire a new technology or weapon system. The factors pushing such decisions are beyond anybody’s control. This is further complicated by the constant evolution in technology. Under such circ*mstances, the defence system of a country largely built on imported arms and equipment becomes inflexible to meet new challenges.
Moreover, experience has shown that importing arms and equipment does not contribute to strengthening the domestic defence industrial base. This is so in spite of much hyped transfers of technology, license production, etc. as a part of import agreements. Ideally, a country’s defence industry should be dynamic enough to meet the peacetime requirements of the armed forces while at the same time being expandable to meet wartime needs or emergencies. But a defence system that purely relies on imported arms and equipment will not be dynamic in meeting such eventualities, but would instead be more of an impediment in handling unforeseen and unpredictable situations, which is the hallmark of security management. India has sufficient experience in this regard.
At the conceptual level, imported weapon systems skew the process of determining and conceptualising future equipment needs. Decision making of this kind is quite complex and even advanced countries like the United States finds it difficult to fine tune their policy in this regard. Defence requirements are determined by the interplay of the ‘user’s perception or interest,’ the interest and capabilities of defence companies or contractors and the interest of procuring authorities represented at the apex level by the concerned ministry or the political leadership. When these players throw their cards in the selection of technology and equipment for the armed forces in situations where imports predominate, the reference points and unseen actors are often the foreign suppliers. Instinctively, the sophisticated nature of imported arms plays a crucial role in the ultimate decision making. This is particularly so in India where there is a penchant for anything ‘foreign’. Consequently, the stranglehold of foreign suppliers proves to be more widespread though invisible. This adversely impacts upon the germination and growth of technology within the domestic defence industry, thus perpetuating underdevelopment.
The cost of importing arms and equipment is high. India spent over US $10.5 billion in arms imports during the last three years and is expected to spend another $30 billion in the next five years. In addition are the costs associated with installations, training manpower, and operating and integrating new acquisitions with existing weapons systems. This is why the concept of life cycle cost of equipment has become an important factor in decision making on arms procurement. It has been the general experience that for an aircraft with a lifespan of 15 years one has to add a further 30 per cent to its production cost for maintenance alone during this period, apart from other associated costs. The trajectory of maintenance cost is equally high if not more in the case of defence equipment. The longer one keeps equipment the greater its maintenance cost, whereas its effectiveness will remain constant or reduce vis a vis potential adversaries. This is often further compounded by the non-availability of spares and components, a situation which gets particularly worse when the supplier happens to be an integrator of various systems of different companies. Maintenance, substitution or upgradation, all become almost impossible. Under such circ*mstances, the equipment itself becomes the problem. India has encountered many problems of this nature.
The most crucial aspect, however, is that the import of arms and equipment ‘supplies technology’ but does not transfer technology. Even in cases of a contractual obligation for transfer of technology, the seller does not does transfer the ability to upgrade the technology when the need arises. The problem gets further complicated particularly when the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) happens to be only an ‘integrator’ as highlighted above, which is a growing phenomenon in defence technology. This again is amply proved by the Indian experience. It is true that the country does gain some technological skills through import, is able to build up its defence capability and gains a certain respectability in its international dealings. But the fact remains that in spite of the avowed policy of ‘self reliance’ and ‘indigenisation’ over fifty years, the periodically massive import of sophisticated defence equipment is a clear testimony to the fact that this policy has not helped the country to build up its domestic defence industrial base. Almost all major equipment used by the armed forces are of foreign origin, and as when even upgradation is considered the original suppliers have to be involved.
While it may be necessary to resort to arms imports to bridge the gap between perceived security threats and the immediate capabilities of the domestic defence industry, a serious review of the current policy is a must to overcome import dependence.
There is always a crucial link between “National Governance” and “Internal Security”. If Internal Security is not maintained Governance cannot be delivered and there would be grave threats to the very unity and integrity of the country. Likewise, Internal Security cannot be safeguarded if Governance is delivered by an inefficient and corrupt administration.
It is perhaps not necessary to define Governance. However, in the simplest terms, governance relates to the effective management of national affairs at all levels of functioning – guaranteeing the country’s unity and integrity and securing the safety and overall welfare of its people. For the attainment of these objectives it would be essential that political, economic, executive and judicial authority is exercised in a manner which ensures that the people are enabled to enjoy their rights, discharge their obligations and resolve their disputes within the parameters of the Constitution and the Rule of Law.
Our exhaustive Constitution provides the basis of the relationship between the Union and the States and delineates the Legislative, Judicial and Executive framework within which the Union and the States shall discharge their respective responsibilities for delivering governance. The Preamble to our Constitution provides the key to its philosophy: it enshrines the sovereignty of the people and envisions a socialist, secular, democratic republic based on justice, liberty, equality and fraternity.
The principles of governance of our country are excellently enunciated in the chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of India. It has been laid down (Article 37) that the provisions contained in this chapter shall be “fundamental in the governance of the country” and that it shall be the “duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws”.
The founding fathers of the Constitution of India were acutely aware that political democracy would have no significance unless it was accompanied by social and economic democracy. It was their belief that, within the democratic framework, clean and efficient governance would transform the social, economic and political life of our people and build a strong, prosperous and vibrant nation. The Directive Principles, described as the `core’ or the `conscience’ of our Constitution, provide the goals and guidelines which, if vigorously pursued and timely implemented, would have led to removing the inequalities and disabilities suffered by large segments of our society and thus paved the way for the achievement of social and economic justice.
We have still to traverse a very long distance to achieve our nation-building goals. About a quarter of our population still lives below the poverty line. The persistence of large-scale poverty and illiteracy, the lack of employment, shelter, clean drinking water, basic sanitation and health care, food and nutrition, and the yawning gaps in the achievement of various other vital developmental targets manifest the serious failures of national governance. The default in achieving social and economic justice has perhaps been the most signal failure.
The failures of governance have led to the recognition that governance shall become honest and effective, and inequalities shall start reducing, when the people are empowered and the communities are enabled to manage their own affairs. In this context, the 73rd and the 74th Amendments to the Constitution provide the constitutional mandate for the provision of self-governance through the establishment of duly empowered rural and urban local self governing institutions. It is a matter for deep regret that the States have still to evince the required political will to effectively pursue the path of democratic decentralisation.
Thus, today, in large parts of the country, the people’s sovereignty still means no more than the right to exercise their vote whenever elections are held. It is, however, a matter for enormous satisfaction that despite failures on various fronts and despite the serious shortcomings of the electoral processes, the spirit of democracy stands deeply rooted in our country.
Among the many reasons for the continuing failures of governance a significant factor has been the instability of the political regimes in the States from around the late 1960s and at the Centre in the past decade and a half. From 1989 onwards, there were six governments at the Centre in less than a decade. It has also been seen that frequent elections have not invariably engendered conclusive outcomes. In recent years no single party or pre-poll alliance of parties has succeeded in securing a clear majority. Unstable coalition governments in the States, perennially occupied in combating threats to their survival, have failed to deliver effective governance.
It may be relevant, to observe that, over the years, the politicisation of caste and communal identities has led to divisiveness and disruption of the national ethos. The failure of the electoral system to prevent anti-social, communal, undesirable and even criminal elements from contesting and winning elections has contributed to the progressive decline of the polity and the consequential failure of the State Assemblies and the Parliament to effectively discharge their vital constitutional roles.
Consequent to the 1993 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai, a Committee was established, on the direction of the Prime Minister, to enquire into certain aspects of the bombings. In September 1993 this Committee, generally referred to as the Vohra Committee, had reported the existence of a deep nexus between political personalities, public servants and crime syndicates. As per the Director CBI’s report to this Committee “all over India crime syndicates have become a law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle men have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have become part of these organisations. The nexus between the communal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the country”. Quoting the Director Intelligence Bureau, the Committee reported that the Mafia network is “virtually running a parallel government, pushing the State apparatus into irrelevance” and that in certain States “ these gangs enjoy the patronage of local politicians, cutting across party lines, and the protection of functionaries …. Some political leaders become the leaders of these gangs/armed senas and, over the years, get themselves elected to local bodies, State Assemblies and national Parliament”. By all accounts, over the past decade and a half, this criminal nexus has enlarged and extended its reach.
Governance has been adversely affected also because political leaders remain incessantly preoccupied with the narrow, sectarian and partisan interests of their parties and the pursuit of day-to-day political gains, and have no time or patience to attend to the crying needs of the common man. The failure of the political executive to devote sustained attention to its constitutional responsibilities has led to the governmental functioning in the States being marred by gross delays, inefficiency, insensitivity, unaccountability and pervasive corruption.
Today, thanks to the information technology revolution and the fast spreading reach of the media, the awareness and expectations of the average citizen have been significantly enhanced. This has, correspondingly, generated much deeper dissatisfaction with the failures of governance. Unless urgent and ruthless steps are taken to check maladministration and corruption the anger and disgust of the common people, particularly the disadvantaged and oppressed elements, could lead to their alienation. And past experience has shown that alienated elements can be easily lured to adopting the gun culture and joining unlawful networks whose activities cause serious public disorders.
In the past decade and more, despite the constraints of governance under coalition governments, the rate of the country’s economic growth has been consistently higher than at any time in the past. It is heartening to observe that the new economic strength is being utilised to significantly enhance the investments in human development and poverty eradication programmes and for the execution of varied schemes for improving the quality of life of the common man.
In the obtaining environment of steady economic growth and dynamism, the interest of foreign governments, companies, investors and entrepreneurs has been growing steadily. Quite understandably, foreign investors would keep a close watch on the situation in our country, to be assured of the security of their assets and holdings. In this context, national governance has the super-added responsibility of ensuring that internal security is effectively maintained to promote our growing international trade and business interests which are vital for the steady growth of our economy.
Let us now take a quick look at the constitutional position in regard to national security management in our country.
The safeguarding of national security encompasses eternal vigilance to meet every threat to the Indian State from every possible source within the country and from anywhere across its land or sea borders or from across the air space.
Broadly speaking, national security would comprise external security, i.e. safeguarding the realm against any external threat, and internal security, i.e. maintenance of security within the entire country. National security management would also encompass employment, food, water and shelter security; fiscal and economic security; energy, science, technology and environment security; cyber security, et al. However, for the purpose of this Lecture I shall speak only about issues relating to internal security management.
For appreciating the implications of internal security it may be useful to keep in mind the physical parameters of our concerns which, while being generally well known, are invariably forgotten.
India is the seventh largest country in the world with an area of about 33 lakh sq kms. It has land boundaries of 15,200 kms, over 600 island territories, a coastline of over 7500 kms and an EEZ of 25 lakh sq kms. We have land frontiers and maritime boundaries with half a dozen neighbouring countries. Except some of our hinterland States, e.g. Haryana and Madhya Pradesh, all other States and some of the Union Territories have one or more land or sea borders which require to be guarded. Our borders with Pakistan and China are militarised; those with Pakistan have generated a variety of threats ever since Independence.
While discussing India’s security concerns it would also be useful to remember that our country represents an immense cultural and geographical diversity and socio-religious traditions which go back to 5000 years of recorded history. The well over a billion people of India comprise multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural societies. We have 22 major languages and over 1500 dialects. Every major religion in the world is practiced in India. The roots of India’s secular and pluralistic traditions are imbedded deep in our ancient history.
India’s internal security problems, arising from varied sources, are influenced by a host of factors among which are its past history, geography, colonial legacy, a burgeoning population, sharp social and economic disparities and complex socio-cultural and ethno-religious traditions which interplay freely in our secular democracy. As events in the past decades have shown, regional and global developments have also been impacting significantly on our security concerns.
Under our Constitution, “Public Order” and “Police” are included in the State List (List II, Seventh Schedule). Consequently, for maintaining internal security the States have exclusive powers [Article 246(3)] to make laws and take all necessary executive action in respect of both the aforesaid subjects. Thus, in the normal circ*mstances, the States are responsible for maintaining internal security within their jurisdictions.
As regards the Centre’s responsibility, the Constitution prescribes [Article 355] that it shall be the duty of the Union to protect the States against external aggression and internal disturbances and to ensure that the governance of every State is carried on in accordance with the Constitutional powers, failing which Presidential Rule may be imposed [Article 356] in the defaulting State, till constitutional functioning can be restored. The Constitution also provides [Article 352] for the enforcement of Emergency if a situation exists or there is an imminent danger of the security of India being threatened by war or an armed rebellion.
Looking back, from 1947 onwards the country has faced varied internal security problems. Some of the more serious threats have emanated from Pakistan’s unceasing efforts to seize J&K and its sustained strategy to create chaos and disorder to de-stabilise and “break up” India.
India has been facing increasing internal security threats in the past years and, as today, the public order in about 40% of the districts is seriously affected by insurgencies, terrorist activities or political extremism. From around the early 1980s the Pak ISI succeeded in launching terrorist activities in Punjab, which suffered enormous human and economic losses for over a decade, till the situation was normalised. Benefiting from the experience gained from its foray into Punjab, Pakistan launched a proxy-war in J&K in end 1989. Over the past nearly two decades now, the continuing wave of terrorism has resulted in the loss of thousands of innocent lives, ruined the economy and, worst of all, shattered the historical secular fabric of Kashmir. In the North East region, several States have continued to face varying insurgencies, many of which have been accentuated by Pak’s ISI cross-border networks. The illegal immigration from Bangladesh has led to a demographic upheaval and generated serious communal, political, social and economic tensions and conflicts in several areas of the NE region.
Instigated by the Pak ISI, and spurred by domestic factors, there has been a steady increase in the growth of pan-Islamic militant outfits which have been preaching fundamentalism and spreading subversion and violence. Over the years, the reach of these networks has spread to areas in Central and South India.
The Left-Wing extremist groups, specially the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, have been continuing to enlarge their violent activities, which have progressively spread to cover vast tribal areas in several States.
Several organised crime and mafia groups have linked up with Pak ISI supported networks and progressively extended their criminal, subversive and communal activities. The narcotics and drug mafia outfits, also involved in the smuggling of weapons, RDX and other materials for causing death and destruction, have been carrying out large scale havala and money laundering operations. The enormous funds generated by the unlawful activities of these groups have been utilised for spreading Islamic fundamentalism, creating violence and executing terrorist activities. Serious threats to internal security have emerged from the Pak ISI linking up with organised crime and mafia outfits and exploiting this nexus to organise major violent incidents in various cities of India, virtually at their will.
For the past nearly three decades now, ever since Pakistan’s initial venture to foment militancy in Punjab, the Centre has been kept incessantly engaged in dealing with serious internal security problems—in the North East region, Punjab, J&K, in the various States affected by the activities of the Naxalite groups, and in all the areas affected by violence caused by Islamic fundamentalist groups. The restoration of normalcy in any disturbed area has inescapably involved the application of coercive power, which, in other words, means the deployment of the required strength of Central Police Forces and, as required, contingents of the Indian Army.
From the experience gained in combating militancy, insurgencies and terrorist activities in the past years it has become abundantly clear that the responsibility of the disturbed States does not end merely with the deployment of State or Central Police Forces, or even the Army, to restore the disturbed area to normalcy. The Armed Forces of the Union are deployed in aid of the civil authority and, constitutionally, the concerned State remains entirely responsible till normalcy is fully restored.
It is necessary to recognise that the deployment of Central Police Forces, or the Army, for carrying out anti- insurgency/terrorist operations may not yield the expected outcome unless the entire State administrative machinery, led by the Chief Minister, devotes continuous organised attention to sensitively dealing with the root causes which contributed to the breakdown of public order. Time bound initiatives would need to be implemented to identify and resolve the social and economic problems or the political demands and aspirations of the agitating groups. Simultaneously, the entire State administration apparatus would require to devote close and continuous attention to providing effective governance, systematic attention being paid to resolve the day-to-day difficulties faced by the common man, particularly those which may have emerged on account of the ongoing disturbed situation. Instead of slackening its functioning on account of the prevailing disturbed environment, the administrative apparatus would need to work overtime to ensure that all socio-economic development and poverty alleviation programmes are implemented with high efficiency and honesty and within an urgent time frame.
For timely dealing with arising internal security problems, the State Governments need to exercise constant vigilance, particularly in regard to the resolution of complex pending issues, and launch prompt initiatives to open meaningful dialogue with the leaders of the aggrieved groups or communities. Past experience has shown that very high human and economic costs have to be paid if there is a failure to deal timely with issues which can lead to conflicts and violence. The situation is further complicated when a violent agitation, arising from a sensitive demand, is dealt with merely as a law and order problem and the disturbance sought to be quelled with the application of force. In many such cases the agitating elements are supported and incited by adversary external agencies and, when this happens, we see the beginning of much larger problems.
The deep despair and consequent alienation of the disadvantaged communities is heightened by the social, economic and political exploitation to which they are subjected. Feudal systems continue to exist in several parts of the country where the much needed land, agrarian and other, reforms have still to be carried through. It is indeed most unfortunate that despite the economic disparities and severe disadvantages from which they suffer, the neglected and oppressed segments of society are further subjected to continuing harassments which arise from the various political parties exploiting religious, ethnic and caste factors merely to secure electoral gains.
Besides the gross failures of governance to pursue the avowed welfare-state goals and deliver social and economic justice to the masses, there has also been failure to timely and sensitively respond to the felt needs and aspirations of ethnic and tribal communities, most of whom live in remote, difficult and harsh areas. The demands of such neglected communities have been ignored for prolonged periods and if and when any ameliorative action has been taken it has happened essentially to secure an envisaged electoral gain for the party in power. Such failures of governance have promoted distrust and alienation among the neglected communities, which no longer have any faith or trust in their State Governments.
The poor and neglected people have many other reasons to be angry and frustrated. For example, the large outlays provided to the States for poverty alleviation schemes are not timely or fully utilised. In many cases, the funds are diverted to other purposes or even embezzled. Such gross failures result in despair, cynicism and deep seated alienation among the poorest segments of society.
Failures of this kind arise from continuing mal-administration, unaccountability and corruption. Despite endless public criticism in the past several decades, effective steps have still to be taken to deal with corruption at the highest levels and to enforce efficiency, honesty and accountability in the functioning of governmental and public institutions. The Lok Pal Bill has been awaiting enactment for the past nearly four decades now, and the functioning of the Lok Ayukts, established in many States, has still to see even the known crooks being brought to book. Needless to stress, if good governance is to be delivered perhaps the most crucial challenge is to restore ethical and moral values to public life in our country.
Corruption erodes and weakens the very foundations of the administrative and legal framework and disrupts the Rule of Law. Thus, internal security cannot be safeguarded unless the governmental apparatus is rid of corruption.
Corruption has the subversive effect of destroying discipline. And indiscipline leads to the unaccountability which has permeated the administrative apparatus and also led to the growth of the threatening politico-bureaucratic-criminal nexus, about which a reference was made earlier.
Efforts to reduce corruption do not invariably yield the expected outcome as most of the tainted elements enjoy the patronage and protection of their political masters who have placed them in key positions and continue to use them for the execution of their unlawful behests. As I had stated earlier, from the perspective of effective internal security management it is a matter for deep concern that even persons of highly questionable integrity, who may have close linkages with criminal and anti-national elements, could continue to hold responsible positions in the administrative system. The potential of such elements subverting national interests from within the system poses a most serious threat to the security of the State.
The continuing determined efforts of adversary external agencies to destabilise India by spreading religious fundamentalism, inciting tensions which lead to conflicts, and perpetrating violence and subversion, have generated challenges which impinge on issues of external security management. In this context it needs to be recognised that issues relating to the management of internal and external security have got inextricably interwoven and, as such, the Centre would need to evolve a holistic approach to internal security management, in close coordination with the States. I would re-iterate that in the security scenario, which has evolved over the past three decades and more, it would be impractical, in fact extremely hazardous, to deal sectorally with the management of internal and external security issues.
Internal security cannot be maintained satisfactorily in the country unless the States effectively discharge their constitutional duty of maintaining peace and public order in their realms. The States cannot pass on this crucial responsibility to the Centre, as has been the continuing trend in the past years. A signal failure of the States has been the continued neglect and the political exploitation of their Police organisations. This has most adversely affected the discipline, morale, efficiency, honesty and trustworthiness of the constabulary. It is essential that every State undertakes a time-bound programme to enlarge, train and equip its Police to effectively manage the existing and emerging challenges as well as to provide very strong support for the implementation of the Centre’s initiatives to maintain public order in the entire country.
It may be noted that a stable security environment cannot be engendered merely by promulgating new laws. In the ultimate analysis every citizen must discharge his duty to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of the country. It is indeed unfortunate that while the vast majority of our educated people are concerned only about their Fundamental Rights there are not very many who are even aware of their Fundamental Duties, laid down in Article 51A of the Constitution. Even if action were to be taken to enforce the Fundamental Duties of our citizens it would be unsound to assume that the citizenry of India would be overnight imbued with patriotic feelings to protect national interests if the environment in which they live and work continues to be vitiated by discrimination, corruption and injustice. The requisite environment can be engendered only if the States perpetually demonstrate and ensure that the laws of the land apply equally also to the rich and influential and the highest placed public servants. Simultaneously, it must be particularly ensured that no injustice is done to the poor and the disadvantaged segments of society as this would result only in promoting distrust and despair among the masses and further eroding their loyalties.
In the aforesaid context it has also to be noted that lawlessness cannot be controlled and internal security maintained unless the entire framework of the criminal justice system functions with speed, fairness and transparent honesty. In 2005, of the over 23 million cases awaiting disposal in the country over 7 million IPC crime cases were pending trial. The ever increasing number of criminal cases awaiting investigation and trial and the correspondingly declining conviction rates, have generated the growing public perception that crime is a “low-risk, high-profit business”.
Besides the enormous logistical inadequacies in the justice delivery system, the integrity of the magistracy and the subordinate judiciary is seriously tainted. In the recent past serious allegations of questionable integrity have been raised even against those who man the superior echelons in our judicial structure. Needless to say, the most urgent measures need to be taken to clean up the justice administration apparatus and enlarge and strengthen it to deliver speedy and effective justice. Another cause for serious concern is that while we continue to have hundreds of altogether obsolete and irrelevant laws, most of which were enacted during the colonial period, we do not have an adequately stringent law, applicable all over the country, which can effectively meet the requirements of dealing with terrorist offences, cyber crimes and the fast growing areas of organised criminality which pose a grave threat to national security. We also do not have a Federal Crime Agency which can deal with the serious offences committed by criminal networks whose activities may spread across the States, across the entire country and across various foreign lands. We also need a comprehensive law for dealing with serious economic offences which, if not timely checked, have the potential of disrupting the national economy. Today, terrorist and criminal networks operate in a border-less world and, needless to say, the grave challenges posed by their activities cannot be tackled if the various concerned law enforcing agencies continue to operate within their respective limited jurisdictions. What is urgently required is an appropriate legal framework and an extremely well considered strategy which is executed in the most effective coordination between the Centre and the States, to deal with each and every aspect of internal security management.
Another matter for serious concern relates to the failure, over the past six decades, to develop a pool of functionaries who have been especially trained to manage the security apparatus at the Centre. Only the Intelligence Bureau has a sub-cadre of deputationist Indian Police Officers who, after acquiring the required experience, comprise the core of the Bureau and can spend their entire careers in this agency. RAW, the agency for external intelligence, has been facing serious personnel problems and recently there have been a number of incidents of grave professional failures. As per the continuing practice, the officers assigned to posts in the Home Ministry, drawn from various services and cadres, are not required to possess any past experience in the field of security management. The situation in the States is much worse. It is a matter for deep concern that despite the serious challenges to national security faced by the country it has still not been recognised that security management cannot any longer be entrusted to persons who have no training or experience in this field. It is also no longer viable to entrust the work of Intelligence agencies only to officers of one particular service. It is necessary that very high priority is accorded for raising a pool of adequately trained and trusted officers who can be assigned to posts in the Intelligence Agencies and the Departments and Ministries which are responsible for managing internal and external security.
In the aforesaid context, particularly keeping in view that even key posts in the Home and Defence Ministries and their related agencies are, on many occasions, assigned to functionaries who have no prior experience of working in the security administration arena, I had proposed (in the Task Force Report on Internal Security, September 2000) that Government may consider the establishment of a dedicated Security Administration Cadre which is comprised of officers selected from among volunteers from the Civil and Police Services, Defence Services, Defence Science Research Organisation, Science and Technology, Information and Communication Technology, Broadcasting and Media and other relevant areas. It was envisaged that such a pool of officers, in various age groups, would be properly trained and assigned to posts in the security management machinery. After critically assessing their performance, the selected officers could be allowed, as is done in the Intelligence Bureau, to enjoy open-ended tenures so that, over time, they acquire the much needed professional expertise which is sorely lacking in the existing set-up. It was projected that, once such a dedicated cadre gets adequately established, Government would be able to select the most suitable officers, from within this pool of officers, to man posts at given levels in the Union Home Ministry, the Intelligence Agencies, National Security Council Secretariat, Ministry of Defence and other security management related areas. Side by side, the States could be provided required support, particularly well designed training facilities, to raise similar cadres. The Government had approved the aforesaid approach in early 2001. Nearly seven years have since elapsed. It is apparent that Government do not intend to terminate the continuing practice of even the topmost posts in the security apparatus being filled by persons who have no past experience in security management.
I would conclude by saying that considering the extremely worrying scale and pattern of the internal security failures in the recent past, the Centre would need to significantly enlarge the capacity of its Intelligence agencies, and to also ensure that the States take similar action, so that a constant vigil can be effectively kept across the length and breadth of the country. The Centre would also need to most vigorously pursue the States to ensure that the functioning of their Police forces is completely depoliticised and their autonomous working entrusted to the best available officers, known for their integrity and professionalism. The speediest possible measures must also be taken to revive the criminal justice system and restore its credibility. It is equally important that the State Chief Ministers urgently bring themselves around to fully understanding the altogether grave consequences if they fail to maintain peace and order within their jurisdictions or dither in providing total support and coordination to the Centre’s initiatives to make the management of internal security more effective.
And finally, I would re-iterate that effective enforcement of the Rule of Law is crucial to the maintenance of national security and delivery of good governance. Any threat to the constitutional values poses a threat to the very foundations of our polity and society and, consequently, to the very unity and integrity of our country.
Introduction
I am indeed privileged to address this gathering and share my perspectives on ‘IAF in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities’. I propose to begin with a recap of the environment and then go on to discuss threat perceptions, nature of conflicts, role of aerospace power, the IAF, its modernisation, challenges and future opportunities.
History shows us that the global environment continually changes; sometimes in a predictable and evolutionary manner and at others in a random or revolutionary way. National institutions must reflect current realities, contemporary systems and technologies. It’s a continuous process of change and adaptation that is particularly necessary for the Armed Forces.
The Environment
Global
One of the defining characteristics of the contemporary global geo-political environment is that a nation’s power is increasingly determined by its economic might and technological prowess, rather than by its military strength. Though interdependent, the most fundamental is economic strength, without which, none of the other indices of power can be created or sustained. At the same time economic growth is not guaranteed without the protective cover of military power, in what is referred to as its ‘peace dividend’.
Popular phrases that describe today’s world are interdependence, global village, flat world etc. Certainly, there is heightened interaction and cross-pollination in every sphere. This interdependence leads to a ‘balancing of interests’; instead of ‘balance of power’; and the politics of ‘confrontation’ has been replaced to a large extent by the more nuanced – ‘competition and cooperation’.
Asia and India
Indeed, Asia is the current power-house and every major power has presence and high stakes here. Asian countries have greater influence around the world as well and military capabilities are now substantial on the continent. The region is also witness to conflicts & instabilities, as peoples attempt to reconfigure their settings, the reverberations of which are felt around the world. It is also a region of nuclear proliferation and increasingly, the cradle and playground of terrorism.
India is situated in a turbulent part of the continent. Its size, resources, capabilities and growth also endow it with power, visibility, influence and responsibility for a greater role in regional affairs.
Threat Perceptions
So what is the impact on our security and threat perceptions? Territorial disputes still linger, our adversaries are acquiring ever greater military capabilities. Cross-border terrorism and internal security challenges persist. At the same time trade and energy security add to our considerations and are a potential source of conflict. This encourages an outward orientation, which is good.
Ideological divisions in the modern world still exist, but in other forms, such as democracies vs autocracies or fundamentalists vs the secular. These strains and tendencies exist within and outside our country too and impact our security calculus; turning into militant aspirations, that challenge national integrity. These have in the past sought to re-draw national boundaries and many still abound, even drawing covert support from outside the country. If we were to include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction then we collectively face a very serious threat indeed. Meeting these challenges requires understanding, as well as careful handling. Invariably, in these situations, one finds the lines between policing and military operations blurred.
Yet another area of concern for us, is ethnic Indian population, residing in other parts of the world, which at times may need protection and support. There have been instances of this in the past. On the flip-side, migrant populations have changed the demographic character of our border states and impacted their polity, with attendant security connotations. We are all aware that non-traditional threats create crisis situations that in the end require the military’s organisational capabilities and technical support. Keeping the peace is yet another important international commitment for Indian Armed Forces.
There is no longer the comfortable immunity from problems in some distant part of the globe. This entwining of interests and effects can work both ways and nations that anticipate and act have the advantage. It is not easy for a single nation to ensure peace and stability for itself, on its own. This encourages, indeed demands international cooperation. This realisation or compulsion is very visible the world over. India’s international cooperation too has considerably increased, translating into increased engagement in all spheres, including military exchanges and interactions. The role of military diplomacy has also been enhanced. The significance of collective security and cooperative organisations has increased over time. India too seeks increased and active part in cooperative mechanisms, though joining collective security organisations is not our policy. An associated challenge sometimes is to prevent from being subsumed by a more prolific and larger friend and retain independence.
On the whole, India is faced with the full ‘spectrum of threats’ from nuclear confrontation, through conventional war; to conflicts limited in area, scope or objectives; to the lower end friction, such as insurgencies, terrorism etc. Moreover, India needs to be prepared for the escalation of conflict from limited upto nuclear. The spectrum has also acquired a complexity and technological sophistication, making it prudent and necessary to move away from a ‘threat-based preparation’, to a more accommodative and flexible – ‘capability-based approach’. This would help lessen the uncertainty and unpredictability, because capabilities could then be readily tailored to suit the challenge at hand.
Nature of Conflict
While, the probabilities of total wars and extensive mobilisations may have reduced, India still must be prepared for a full-fledged and conventional conflict. Nuclear power-play has increased in the region and impacts postures and strategies. In a more integrated and interdependent world, the spillover of conflict in the neighbourhood and its negative global consequences makes it everybody’s concern. While there would be supporters for either party, the sum of international pressure would be to end conflict. Moreover, the battle spaces are now transparent to the public, and legalities cannot be ignored. Therefore, limited, but high-tech wars of high intensity are more likely. Aerospace power has a distinct advantage in such a scenario. Determining the objectives and the end-state in a limited war is critical, but poses dilemmas. Perceptions matter too. The Indian politico-military leadership must continually work for clarity in military objectives and desired end-states.
While the future is uncertain, wars will be multi-dimensional, requiring an inter-disciplinary approach and the marshalling of all organs of national power. Military power is a critical component of national power, without which, as history bears out, progress is possible only up to the point where it clashes with the interests of another stronger nation. Often, assumptions of conflicts and military capabilities are based on the classical war scenario. However, the IAF recognises that complex military challenges require different force constructs, for different situations, ranging from highly mobile and effective conventional forces, to ‘rapid - reaction joint special-forces’. It is here that Air Power could provide the crucial edge. Clearly, future conflicts are likely to be short and sharp; more challenging & unpredictable, requiring a capability for assured, clean, swift, calibrated, varied and flexible responses and a transportability of national power in all forms.
Aerospace Power
Of all forms of military power, it is aerospace power that intrinsically possesses the characteristics that enable such responses. I am by no means lessening the import of other forms of military power, yet modern aerospace capabilities have as much, or perhaps greater impact than what maritime power did for colonising nations in the past. Unlike the latter, whose applicability is determined by a country’s geographic location; and the land forces, whose shape and size are determined by relations with neighbours, size of the country and internal security compulsions; aerospace power has a more universal applicability. That is why even armies and navies strive to assimilate organic aerospace capabilities.
Recent technological developments, including the synergy of air & space, have enhanced aerospace force unprecedently, making it astonishingly reliable, effective, clean and responsive and the ‘preferred instrument’, in most situations of peace or war. It has enabled effects-based operations, made simpler parallel operations and creates strategic effects with a small footprint. Aerospace power is empowering and futuristic and easily lends its strengths and capabilities to other disciplines. In the Indian context, all forms of military power are necessary and important, however, strategic aerospace power offers newer options, both for our northern concerns, as well as for our outward orientations.
I wish to highlight that aerospace power is inherently flexible and its application is not constrained by geographical areas. It can easily be assigned to any task on priority to attain the objectives – current or overall. IAF’s doctrines and plans are founded accordingly. I mention this as some believe that air power doctrines are rigid and unaccommodative. Debates have taken place on ‘Counter Air Operations’ (the so-called air war) vs ‘Counter Surface Force Operations’. It has been said that the IAF attributes less importance to the latter. But contrary to perception in some quarters, a large part of IAF’s effort in past conflicts has been in support of the surface battle. Our current plans too, allocate a sizeable portion of air effort towards CSFO.
The IAF
Evolution and Status
Lets take a brief look at the IAF, its Evolution & Status, Role and Goals. From Counter-Insurgency in its early years, to Army cooperation in WW-II, the IAF was a tactical force. Today, it is a strategic force – powerful, professional and proven. Though the transition to strategic capability has been slow in coming, the process must be sustained, if we are to effectively influence events within India’s strategic boundaries.
In its 76th year, the IAF with its fine combination of Air Warriors, machines and ethos has proved itself time and again. Status of the Force and strength of the economy have boosted our International Defence Cooperation, including assistance to friendly air forces. Trans-continental reach has enabled exercises with friendly Air Forces on all Continents, which is an excellent way to train, assimilate best practices and strengthen bonds of friendship. The IAF is also a sought-after contributor to UNPKO. Currently, we have four highly acclaimed missions in the Congo & Sudan. The IAF also remains at the forefront of the Nation’s HA / DR missions. IAF’s uniqueness lies in its rich all-terrain experience and its diverse inventory. Its capability and reach have enhanced significantly in the last decade.
Roles
Given our situation, concerns and aspirations, a strong and comprehensive aerospace capability is inescapable. The IAF’s roles can be described as Deterrence, Punishment, Protection, Projection and Peace-time roles. It will be readily apparent, that India needs its air force to execute all of these. The IAF must be a strong ‘deterrent’, in a tough neighbourhood. Implicit in the deterrence is the ability for swift, calibrated, but effective ‘punishment’. Our deterrence currently includes the nuclear dimension. The IAF’s primary and traditional role is ‘protection’ or Air Defence, the scope of which will expand as do our interests and reach.
A benign presence, or assistance to friendly nations in distress, is a ‘projection’ of interests that IAF would be expected to execute. This requires long-range presence, persistence, ‘forward-basing arrangements’ etc. Perhaps the most visible demonstration and utility are ‘Peace-time’ applications – both internal and external. They range from airlift and surveillance, to possible offensive action. Military diplomacy is yet another aspect that has increased in recent years yielding handsome friendship dividends. Indeed, IAF today is adequately suited and structured to execute these roles, should the need arise.
Goal
If we look at the way the IAF must evolve and compare it to any other evolving air force; and the path charted by the advanced air forces – there are essential similarities. In fact, but for minor variations, we are on a globally recognised growth path. So, depending upon the circ*mstances, threat perceptions and resources, it is the scope and pace of growth of the Air Force that essentially remain to be managed.
Clearly, the IAF must be equipped for long-reach, persistence, all-weather, precision, air dominance, networked and space-enabled force, capabilities. I am aware that not many air forces have such capabilities, but the IAF, among the leading air forces of the world, can, with the right infusion of technology and training, attain such status. IAF is sensitive to the many competing demands on the nation and doesn’t seek the ‘best and now’, but requisite capability, in time to keep ahead of our adversaries. ‘Requisite Capability, Well in Time; Right People, Well Organised; Assured Performance’ is a phrase that sums up our goal and our emphasis.
Modernisation of the IAF
Though we are a fairly balanced force – we also have shortages, reducing force-levels and gaps in our inventory, which are being addressed with all urgency and governmental support. IAF’s modernisation plan, aims to sustain and enhance its operational potential and consolidate the specified force levels through judicious and cost-effective replacements and upgradation of existing resources. It is a gradual, but transformational modernisation. The approach is three-pronged – preserve upgrade and acquire. All fleets, including transport and helicopters, with residual life, are being upgraded to contemporary standards; so also is operational and maintenance infrastructure and logistic tools. The planned acquisitions are across-the-board and include platforms, weapons, sensors and equipment; spread over the next 10-15 years.
To run through some of our programmes, the MiG-27 and Jaguar upgrades are almost done; the MiG 29, Mirage 2000 are being negotiated and the IL-76, AN-32 and the helicopter fleets will follow. Capabilities of UAVs will also be enhanced. Airfield and maintenance infrastructure are also being enhanced in a phased manner.
The response to RFP for the MMRCA is expected soon. The Hawk AJTs have been inducted. The first AWACS will be with us this year end. Additional Dorniers, Boeings and upgraded Cheetah will soon join the fleet. The contract for C-130Js has already been signed and contracts will soon be signed for Mi-17 1Vs, ALHs, armed ALHs and additional FRA. The 1st LCA Sqn may be operational in IOC configuration by 2010. IAF also seeks new helicopters to replace the Chetaks and a new heavy-lift heptr. Inter-Government Agreements have been signed for the 5th Generation Fighter and Medium Transport Aircraft with the Russian Govt.
Air defence will be significantly strengthened with modern weapon-systems and sensors, including the AWACS & Aerostats. Integration of civil radars will commence this year, for gap-free surveillance of the entire Indian airspace. Force-multipliers, air dominance fighters and a converged, secure ‘Combat Communications Network’ – including the IACCS and later the ODL – will fundamentally alter the IAF’s Air Defence doctrine. For effective command & control, extended reach and to reduce the sensors-to-shooter loop, we are laying due emphasis on Networks and Space, which are essential ‘next steps’.
Challenges
The Hardware – Technological Challenges
I now turn to the challenges facing the IAF. I am aware that in the challenges lie seeds of opportunity and thus how we address them will qualify our future. Technology is at the core of an air force – acquiring and assimilating it is our primary challenge. The lack of it curtails national options, impacting postures and doctrines. Denial and selective availability of technology are all enmeshed in international relations. As long as operationally feasible, the IAF supports the national quest for indigenisation. We recommend acquisition of core-technologies and core-competencies and developing emerging technologies. We also recommend a collaborative and participative approach – of partnerships between users, DRDO, the Industry, the Government and foreign vendors. In these multiple partnerships, we believe that the user must be the captain. We strongly support the Government’s endeavour to transform our current ‘buyer-seller’ relationships to joint-ventures, co-development and co-production.
Maintenance Challenges
While our response to technological challenges will determine the ‘shape’ of things to come, maintenance challenges determine how long they last and their cost-effectiveness. ‘Maintainability’, which includes logistical issues, is therefore, crucial. IAF is proactive on this and has energised interaction with vendors and entered into ‘long-term spares and repair contracts’. We have also put our materials management and equipment accounting on-line.
The People and Organisation
While hardware is important, it is converted into capabilities by people. Aerospace power requires highly-skilled and impeccably trained personnel. Also, in aviation, optimum performance usually lies close to safety margins, which brings in the concern of costs – both in human and material terms. Attracting quality youth, training and retaining them is another of IAF’s challenges. Inculcating qualities of leadership and innovativeness and ushering in meritocracy and productivity are important on our agenda. However, the expanding civil aviation sector exerts a huge ‘pull’ on this resource and we are doing our best to blend personal aspirations with organisational compulsions. We need Government support to make this happen. Updating of skills is an associated challenge, for which international exposure has been very useful. But in the long run we might need an Air University. Again, if our manning is adequate, we would be able to send our people on sabbaticals of higher learning.
As the hardware changes, new capacities and capabilities are generated that sometimes radically alter the way we do business. And it is hard to do things differently with the old processes, interfaces and organisational structures. Keeping pace and adapting to the changes, as an organisation, is another challenge.
Future Opportunities
Shape of Things to Come
I now turn to future opportunities. The most obvious and significant opportunity is already before us. I refer to the modernisation plan. Ideally, modernisation should be evolutionary and continuous. Yet, for a variety of reasons the IAF has in the past modernised in spurts, often as a reaction to circ*mstances. Today, the IAF is in throes of a most comprehensive modernisation, as I described earlier. We call it transformational, for it will change everything dramatically. Being based on long-term perspective plans, most of it is already crystallised. Yet, a lot remains to be determined; many new capabilities are still short of the decision stage. At this juncture, if we are able to synchronise these plans with national security objectives, we would really have utilised this opportunity well. From that arises another opportunity that must be seized and that is the formal enunciation of long-term national security objectives, strategies, as well as technology roadmap and indigenisation strategies.
Much also depends upon the way aerospace power will develop in the future. Beyond the MMRCA and FGFA, with their 40 year ‘lives’, we are at 2060. It is not easy to guess the shape of aerospace power then. Would the accent shift to unmanned flight, to missiles; or would ‘air’ be more of ‘space’. Technological advances are sure to revolutionise military affairs in future too. Despite the unpredictabilities, it is certain that the need for ‘application and transportability’ of national power – hard and soft – and thus for aerospace power, with enhanced fundamentals, would remain. Nations that lack it will seek it, as also will non-state agencies. Aerospace power is bound to proliferate. We also expect aerospace power to permeate the national security apparatus more completely, including for homeland security. IAF foresees greater specialisation; tailored capabilities for each occasion; an increased dependence on unmanned vehicles; greater accent on force enhancers; particularly the intangible ones, such as quality of people and their skills.
Networking and assimilation of space, both interdependent, are already the way forward and can tilt the balance considerably. A quiet ‘space race’ is the current reality and weaponisation, a distinct possibility. Perhaps more than any other, it is air power that is most significantly enhanced by the integration of space-enabled capabilities, for there are essential similarities. Evolving into an aerospace force is thus a logical progression. But, it is getting crowded up there and we need to act fast. Certainly, ‘space’ empowers all, and the IAF supports tri-service initiatives. Yet, any fledgling capability requires residing in an appropriate ‘parent capability’. Air Power, or the IAF, are the closest such ‘capability’, or organisation suitable to host and nurture ‘military space’. India’s rising status and acceptability are an opportunity for us to push for creating an adequate military space capability.
Since IAF requires a comprehensive capability, its future in the long-term, will largely mirror the future of aerospace power itself. Though this path is invariably influenced by leading nations, India and countries like it, must be selective and seek creative variations, both in terms of hardware and doctrine.
Outward Orientation
I have made mention of India’s outward orientation and IAF’s part in it. We find that our international interactions are increasing. Leading nations want to engage us and probably seek to include us in their calculations. Smaller nations look up to us for support, assistance and training. UN commitments are also considerable. We could ignore these opportunities, or we could use them to build Indian influence, generate goodwill and reap multiple dividends.
Synergies
I now turn to synergies and jointness, which the IAF is convinced is the way forward. Just as every tool has a place in the toolbox, every discipline too has its own niche. At the edges of our competencies in complex tasks we often confront impossibilities or failure. If we traverse the boundaries of our discipline into neighbouring or related ones, we can, in concert with them, achieve our aims. In other words, there are other organs of national power and we must learn to use them and interface with them effectively. Such synergy creates desired effects, perhaps at lesser cost and in quicker time. This calls for wisdom, knowledge of other disciplines and lack of parochialism. The future also brings with it the opportunity for creating synergies and national capabilities.
I feel, therefore, that the trick lies in perfecting internal core-competencies, identifying complimentary capabilities in other organisations, developing effective interfaces and training to create and employ a new, enhanced hybrid. We are convinced that such ‘jointness’ is the way forward and that core competencies of each Service, indeed of all organs of national power, must be synergised to generate the required effect and capability. A capability-based approach from development to employment will encourage an inter-disciplinary integration and the coming together of all organs of national power. At the end, it is people that make an institution or system work. The best ones can be rendered ineffective for want of skills and commitment and vice-versa. Essentially, we believe jointness and synergy have less to do with new structures and ownership, but depends upon joint thinkers, planning, capability creations, as well as joint training and execution. Perhaps it is better to grow in an evolutionary manner.
Similarly, it is also imperative that military and civil aviation integrate, to take advantage of each others’ capacities, for better efficiency, cost-effectiveness and for greater options. We have already made available 19 of our front-line air fields for civil air traffic and also allowed transit through Air Force controlled air space, to save time and fuel. IAF has also proposed the ‘flexible use of air space’; and the process for integration of civil and AF radars has begun.
Beyond generating national synergies, aerospace technologies are so expensive, cutting-edge and hard to develop, that I dare say, our quest of these increasingly encourages joint-ventures and sharing of knowledge & resources between nations, and accord opportunity to forge international synergies.
Conclusion
Considerable changes are taking place in the global and regional scenario and in our neighbourhood. Old issues persist, while newer concerns are added. The role of military power has increased, as security concerns spread beyond national boundaries. Aerospace power is futuristic and increasingly utilitarian. The IAF has come a long way and has demonstrated its professionalism and the world has acknowledged it. A strong and professional IAF can contribute to national options and to peace and stability, not only within the country but also within the region. It is a considered opinion that the IAF, with its current capability and plans has the potential to make a very significant impact on the postures we adopt in the future. IAF must therefore grow in step with nation.
Interestingly the very first issue of “Journal of Defence Studies” published by Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in August 2007 decided to focus on the subject of “Jointness in Indian Armed Forces”. There are possibly many more pressing issues impinging on the Indian Armed Forces and National Security, but apparently they were not considered for one reason or the other. “Jointness” was given pride of place as the first topic to be discussed. It was also somewhat surprising that the vast majority of articles in the Journal argued, with palpable passion, that the institution of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was essential for greater efficiency of the Armed Forces and the inculcation of desired jointness. The arguments presented in favour of the institution of CDS are one sided and as a consequence exclude the other possibilities for achieving jointness and efficiency in the armed forces of India. There was no article that represented a view that jointness is desirable but it is premature to think of a CDS at present or that the institution of CDS will be counter productive. Also, it is worth noting, as mentioned by many authors in the journal, that although the Group of Ministers recommended the creation of an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) to be headed by a CDS in 2001, the then Prime Minister Vajpayee accepted the establishment of the IDS but postponed the appointment of the CDS. The situation remains the same today even after a new government under a different Prime Minister came to power in 2004. The IDS is headed by Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) and reports to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). Thus, two Prime Ministers have not deemed it fit to institute a CDS. This cannot be without good reason.
It is worth noting that there are a number of individuals who are of the conviction that a CDS will cause more harm than good. Their views have as much validity as those of the proponents of the CDS concept; points of view that deserve to be aired concurrently for obtaining a more balanced approach to the subject. Again, in spite of the fact that any number of Army Chiefs have ardently supported the establishment of a CDS, the last Army Chief to retire categorically stated that he did not recommend the creation of a CDS for the next 10 to 15 years. General J. J. Singh’s considered views should be taken seriously as he was closely associated with the functioning of the IDS during his career. Yet, the proponents never tire of raising the issue over and over again.
This article will argue that the institution of CDS is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving true jointness among the services. True jointness, however, is a desirable objective and this article will attempt to give an alternate approach to the subject.
We live in an age of specialisation. Jointness is indeed a laudable concept. Operational efficiency and effectiveness, however, should not be sacrificed at the altar of supposed jointness. It is a moot point whether it is desirable to impose if it undermines the very rationale it is meant to support. It has been often stated by the proponents of the CDS system that the concept of integrated defence staff had to be imposed from outside of the armed forces in a number of countries notably in the United Kingdom. Every country has a unique set of problems that demand individual solutions. The same is valid for India. In our case, unfortunately, we have adopted a system of questionable suitability. For instance, the manning of posts in the IDS has been reduced to a system of quotas for each service; and we have insisted on manning of appointments in the senior ranks on a rotational basis irrespective of the type of experience required and demands of the job. This situation highlights the absence of desired jointness in our armed forces. It can be argued that jointness in some form has been ensured, but are the results optimal? The answer is no. Turf battles, career prospect issues, continue to undermine the progress towards the institutionalisation of jointness. As an aside, a senior officer working with the IDS when asked whether the IDS functioning was ensuring better jointness among the armed forces actually questioned whether there was any jointness within the IDS itself! A sad commentary on the state of affairs. It stands to reason that the most suitable person available should be selected for important appointments. This entails experience and on the job training in preparation for the tasks ahead. It is granted that some jobs require little specific specialisation. However, the more important ones do need training and preparation. One option, possibly the best option, is to adopt the system of lead service for different tasks and clearly spell out roles and missions for each service. The roles and missions should be expressly stated, without ambiguity and repetition, and formalised. This will hopefully put an end to turf battles and bring about jointmanship more readily. More importantly, the responsibility and accountability of different services should be unambiguously articulated. This cannot but have a salutary effect. Unfortunately, although the IDS has been in existence for well over six years, the subject has not received the priority it deserves. In the opinion of the author, finalisation of roles and missions is more important than the institution of a CDS. It is also opined that if the services are unwilling to tie themselves to detailed responsibilities under the present dispensation, the creation of a CDS will not help solve the problem. On the other hand, unless we establish responsibilities and accountabilities, jointmanship will remain elusive. The CDS system, as envisaged in the GOM report, places operational responsibility on the CDS but training and operational responsibilities on the service chiefs—an arrangement ill suited for ensuring unambiguous responsibilities and clear accountability. It should also be noted that establishing roles and missions and designating lead service for different tasks can be done by the armed forces themselves without recourse to Government of India orders. If it were to be done, it would be an example of true jointmanship, a far better alternative than a fiat issued that does not represent all shades of opinion.
In the six odd years of IDS functioning, inter alia, a Joint Doctrine has been issued, and some procedural aspects and organisational channels have been worked out. Possibly the most notable achievement is the support given to the procurement process. This has been largely facilitated by the introduction by the Ministry of Defence of a more streamlined and effective Defence Procurement Procedure. However, the working out of priorities has been left to the individual services. A Joint Service prioritisation of procurement that is acceptable to all is still some distance away. The major task of a “purple staff” ought to be to work on required force levels and make recommendations to the COSC on how the Defence Budget should be distributed amongst the services. In fact, in an ideal “joint” situation, there should be only one Defence Budget without subdivision to the respective services. In the absence of stated responsibilities and requirements of future conflicts, a judicious allocation of the Defence Budget is unlikely to have tri-service concurrence. A CDS would also find it extremely difficult to take the responsibility of allocations in the “Defence Budget” over the clamour for funds by the individual services.
Emphasis on the procurement process is well placed, but the process is neither the beginning nor the end of operational capability. The basis of purchases needs to be defined with greater clarity. A good beginning would be to first define, in reasonably cogent terms, the possible and probable types of conflict situations that we are likely to face and the requirements for success. The Services have often complained that the possible threats and tasks should be spelt out by the government. This is unlikely to happen and the Services will have to decide on the threats themselves, hopefully in coordination with other elements involved in national security. In fact, this is as it should be. A joint service organisation like the IDS should take on this task. It is opined that an IDS attempt to establish the threats and opportunities will bolster jointmanship. It will actually represent officers of the three services working together in concert. The experience will be invaluable. Thereafter, the extant capabilities of the armed forces acting independently or in unison should be worked out. It is only afterwards that the planning of defence expenditure can be judiciously attempted. In this system, the analysis of extant capability could pose problems in the absence of a yardstick for estimating capabilities. The process will be facilitated if the roles and missions have been established. Even if individual services are unwilling to spell out their capabilities, the IDS on its own has the required expertise to work out a fair estimate that would be suitable for planning purposes. The procurement process would thereafter be based on logic and rationality. It can also be stated with some confidence that a serious IDS effort to systematically work towards recommending a desired force structure will support and further jointness in a far more acceptable manner than an attempt to impose jointness. The procedure given above is somewhat simplistic. In real life there will be many hurdles and uncertainties but the recommended system, in principle, has considerable merit and should be tried. More importantly, the results will improve with experience. With a considerably better analysis of what we can expect, the demands on intelligence information required in terms of content, repetition etc., can be better established. The importance of good and timely intelligence cannot be over emphasised.
It has often been stated that, in modern conflict, joint conduct of operations is essential to bring about the needed synergy. A caveat may be in order. A single service operation is a valid operation of war and, at times, will be the option of choice. Similarly, occasions could arise where one service or the other is not actively involved in the combat. Again, the relative importance of the role played by different services could vary markedly. All these aspects will take on adverse significance if they are not preceded by joint planning. Joint planning is not a mere phrase or a one-time activity but is a way of life. It has to be a continuous process before and during conflicts. It is the experience of the author that effective joint planning is seldom carried out in peacetime; at best an outline plan is discussed, often with considerable rancour. However, once the shooting war starts, the differences among the services tend to disappear and the war is fought under a readily agreed plan or set of plans. Towards the end of the war, jointness is again given short shrift in the interest of claims and counter claims, accusations and counter accusations, and in attempts to cover mistakes made. Jointness is not one of our strong points. It is again iterated that the desired jointness cannot be imposed except as a peace time exercise. In war, jointness is required not only in the higher direction of war but at every level of combat. An understanding needs to be fostered that jointness is in everyone’s interest and must be attempted. Possibly, this understanding can be better achieved if the responsibilities of the actors are well defined and the requirement to continuously hone the plan based on better training or capabilities is formalised as a system. The planning team could also advise some alterations in training schedules. A part of the IDS has been established for this purpose on a full time basis and they must be tasked to carry out such planning on a continuous basis. The results of their efforts can then be discussed with those involved in the actual conduct of operations to continuously better the product. There is a possible disconnect in that those charged with the conduct of actual operations would much rather do their own planning and be responsible for it. This is a valid argument but the object is not to interfere in the planning for operations by the combat elements but to support them with studies and information to make their planning more scientific. The IDS should recognise that they perform a support or staff function and must not dictate to those charged with and accountable for the actual conduct of operations. A similar pattern should be followed in planning for contingencies and national calamities. Any attempts to portray the IDS as a quasi-superior formation can only be counter productive. It is a well known truism that authority without accountability cannot but lead to bad results. The IDS should have a selfless approach to work towards greater understanding and jointness amongst the armed forces. Such jointness will be based on recognition of need and is likely to be more enduring than attempts to impose jointness by the introduction of the institution sometimes referred to as the “military czar”—the phrase has many avoidable connotations.
It will be seen from the discussion so far that the IDS has an important role to play as long as it is intended to support the functioning of the individual services. Honest attempts in this direction will foster jointness. However, it is often argued, by those wedded to the institution of a CDS, that without a head, the IDS cannot function as well as it should. In fact the CISC does report to the Chairman COSC, who becomes the essential link between the services and the tri-service support or staff organisation. Three other arguments put forth are that the Chairman COSC finds it difficult to wear two hats, the Chairman is rotated very often, and that a CDS will be more impartial in effecting agreements amongst the services. To this writer, all three arguments appear somewhat specious. As it is, the Chairman COSC does wear two hats. Heading the IDS should not be an onerous task given that the IDS is manned by as many as six three star appointments and over a dozen two star officers. The essential task of the Chairman COSC therefore is to guide and oversee the functioning of the IDS—not an onerous task. In fact, as he is the head of a Service, he is in a better position to guide the functioning of the IDS without over extending himself. Similarly, although it would be better if the Chairman COSC were not to be rotated too often, the impact of more frequent rotations should not be too serious. The CISC is invited to COSC deliberations and the Chairman COSC should, without exception, keep his counterparts from the other two services abreast of the functioning of IDS and the initiatives being progressed. In any case, the functioning of the IDS should interest all three service chiefs in near like measure. Thus a somewhat faster rotation of the Chairman COSC should not adversely affect the functioning of the IDS. On the critical question of impartiality of the CDS, the very thought casts avoidable aspersions. All Chiefs are equally responsible for national security, and their impartiality must be taken for granted. Differences in viewpoint are a healthy occurrence, generally arising out of different perceptions based on individual needs and experience. Such perceptions will tend to coalesce if the duties and responsibilities of individual services are formally established. It will also be beneficial if most decisions regarding inter service issues are taken at levels lower than that of the Chiefs. In any case, the CDS will also be a product of the same type of experiences as his counterparts and his perceptions are unlikely to be very different.
As per the current policy on the functioning of the CDS, when and if appointed, the CDS would have very limited operational responsibilities and it would be incorrect to place him as “primus inter pares” over the service Chiefs who are charged with training and command of forces in combat. It would be akin to a staff appointment getting pride of place over an operational billet at the same level—an anachronism. For the same reason, operational recommendations of the CDS would be misplaced as he would be neither responsible not accountable for the results of his recommendations. Hence, either the CDS would be just filling a slot or, if he wants to be active, his recommendations are likely to be challenged by one Chief or the other. In either case, it will represent a retrograde step as far as jointness is concerned.
The CDS, when and if appointed, would also be responsible to provide the single point of military advice to the CCS/RM. It is difficult to imagine how a CDS who is not “hands on” in command of forces can give sound advice relative to or concerning the operational services. More often than not the CDS would be hard pressed to commit forces or address the capabilities of any of the services, particularly the services other than the service whose uniform he wears. Even for advice impinging on his own parent service, the Chief of the service could and would take offence at someone else taking decisions regarding his service. A “super Chief” will be far from welcome. Hence such advice rendered by the CDS would have to be based on either conjecture or second hand information that could lead to some difficulty in a detailed discussion on facts and capabilities. If the decisions are not ex parte, the value of the “single point of military advice” becomes increasingly questionable. An avoidable additional level would have been created that will result in neither better jointness, nor better and timely advice. The appointment of the CDS is not a panacea for all ills inflicting the armed forces—in fact quite the opposite. A CDS will add to the ills. A commitment to jointmanship is not synonymous with a commitment to the post of CDS.
Undoubtedly, future wars are likely to be faster using advanced technology. The old system of war fighting may not be adequate. Much greater cohesion is called for. Towards this end, the IDS has an important role to aid and support operational requirements and needs.
If IDS functioning is restricted to support rather than a propensity to impose, there is a fair chance that better jointness will result. Jointness can also be furthered with clear and formalised roles and missions for the three services. The use of space, communications, Infowar etc will shape the conflict arena and it is strongly recommended that a lead service be appointed for each such area with the IDS providing staff support. Once again jointness would be given a boost. More importantly, a healthy and frequent interaction between the IDS and the services should be encouraged at all levels. Moreover, a formalised system of near continuous inter service planning organisation for war, aspects of war involving two or more services, and a host of contingencies that could arise should be established with staff support from the IDS.
The IDS can be a worthy tool to bring about jointness. However, its tasks and functioning should be better nuanced. A good starting point of reforming the functioning of the IDS would be to audit its functioning over the last six years and more with a view to study the impact of the IDS on jointness and how to achieve better cohesion amongst the services. The recommendations made in this paper should be considered. Unless jointness has been achieved to a considerable degree, it will be premature to even think of the institution of a CDS, leave alone his job description.
Introduction
In the over five decades since Independence, vast changes have occurred in the security environment within the country, in the region of immediate concern, and at the global level. The last two decades have been of special importance, on account of the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the end of the Cold War, the global war on terrorism and the globalisation of the economy.
The defence forces of India, at over 1.3 million strong, are perhaps the fourth largest in the world, in terms of numbers, as well as in terms of some items of capital equipment. Since Independence in 1947, they have been engaged in active operations on a sustained basis, with only short periods of peace. These challenges have helped them to earn a formidable reputation of a force that delivers, usually against heavy odds.
Although the defence forces of India are highly professional, are they structurally, technologically and organisationally sufficiently modern to meet the challenges of the 21st century? They are no doubt large in numbers, but do they also carry the necessary punch? Do they create the necessary synergy that flows from a high degree of jointness? Are they capable of meeting the future challenges, which the country is likely to confront in the next two decades or so? If not, what changes are needed to enhance their capabilities? Should this be achieved by incremental changes or by radical and fundamental reforms? These are a few questions that need to be answered.
Conventional wisdom is that the fighting potential of the defence forces of India has decreased over the last two decades. There are many reasons for this, including a lack of vision and knowledge of security-related issues amongst the political leadership, as also the bureaucracy; decreasing budgetary allocations; antiquated procurement procedures; a costly research department, whose output has been much below expectations and which has prevented the entry of private enterprise in the defence sector; antipathy to change; narrow parochial interests; hesitancy to take risks at the senior leadership level and a status-quo mentality amongst the decision-makers.
The result is that while accretions have taken place in the number of persons in uniform, in the number of additional units and formations, and in the quality and quantity of armaments, the overall structure of the defence forces and the methods of doing business continue to be much the same as they were nearly six decades back.
No person with even some knowledge of “matters military” will have a second opinion about the overwhelming importance of joint endeavours in wars and conflicts of today and even more so those of tomorrow. Besides many other facets, the obvious one of synergy is indisputable. Before initiating a discussion on the kind of jointmanship that needs to prevail, it would be a good idea to know where the Indian military stands in this respect today.
Force structures are never evolved in a vacuum. Many factors need to be considered while carrying out structural changes. Some of these are fairly obvious, while others need considerable thought. Factors which affect the security aspects of the global and regional environment are of great importance and need to be taken into account. Threats and challenges are of course perennial considerations, but at times we tend to forget that national aspirations are crucial to force structuring, as are the desired capabilities the nation wants from its defence forces. The changing security environment is another factor that needs to be taken into account. A consideration of all these factors should logically point towards the size and shape of defence forces the nation needs, as well as the manner in which a transformation is to be achieved. These are the major aspects I intend to cover in this paper. For obvious reasons, the analysis would be broad-based in nature, the details being left to the concerned ministries and departments, which are tasked for such ventures.
Defence Forces of India
Let us briefly recapitulate the current defence forces fielded by India. The strength of the defence forces of India on the active list is approximately 1.3 million, with the army dominating with nearly 1.1 million personnel. The air force has a strength of 140,000 and the navy fields approximately 55,000 personnel. There is a Territorial Army component of approximately 40,000.1
The field force of the army comprises thirteen corps, three armoured divisions, four Reorganised Army plains Infantry Divisions (RAPID), eighteen infantry divisions and ten mountain divisions, a number of independent brigades, and requisite combat support and service support formations and units. The main combat and combat support units are sixty two armoured regiments and there are over three hundred and fifty infantry battalions and three hundred artillery regiments (including two Surface to Surface Missile (SSM) units). Amongst major armaments and equipment, there are nearly 4000 main battle tanks, 2000 armoured personnel carriers, 4300 artillery pieces and 200 light helicopters.2 Unlike most modern armies, the Indian Army fields only reconnaissance helicopters in its aviation corps, with the air force still clinging to attack and medium lift helicopters, which should have been transferred to the army a long time back.
The organisational structure of the army is generally on traditional lines, heavily influenced as it has been by the erstwhile colonial British military. The Indian Army is competent in conducting both conventional as well as low intensity conflict (LIC) operations.
The navy has 26 principal surface combatants, including one aircraft carrier; 49 patrol and coastal combatants and 16 submarines. The naval aviation has 35 combat aircraft and 97 helicopters. There is also a coast guard with 52 patrol craft of various types.3
The air force fields approximately 680 combat aircraft, grouped in 32 fighter ground attack and six fighter squadrons; 40 armed helicopters grouped in three squadrons; 12 transport squadrons; 19 helicopter squadrons and miscellaneous squadrons covering tanker, maritime attack, electronic countermeasures, survey, VIP movement, training and so on.4
The growth of the defence forces of India in the past has usually been as a reaction to contemporary crises. Resultantly, the defence forces have generally remained unchanged, both structurally and in doctrinal terms, except for incremental changes to meet challenges as they arose. In recent years, however, there is a discernable doctrinal shift from attrition to manoeuvre warfare. Since the late 1980’s, availability of funds has been a major constraint, with allocations for defence being less than 2.5 per cent of the GDP.
The three services are organised for conducting largely conventional operations, although a very large component of the army is heavily involved in Low Intensity Conflict operations. In all the three services, there has been some infusion of state-of-the-art equipment and armament, but much less than what is needed.
India is a responsible nuclear weapon state, with an unblemished record of non-proliferation, which cannot be easily matched by even nuclear weapon states of long standing. Our nuclear policy has two main components – minimum deterrence and no first use.
Our higher defence structure is perhaps the weakest part of the defence forces of India. The defence forces are not part of the government of India, but are an attached “office”. The implications of this formulation are obvious and need not be amplified, except to highlight that this arrangement effectively keeps them outside the policy formulation loop. No doubt, the service headquarters are consulted on security issues, but that is no substitute for being part of formulating policy. The highest policy formulation body in the country is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It gets its inputs from a variety of sources, viz. the National Security Council (NSC), the Cabinet Secretariat, different ministries, intelligence agencies and so on. The inputs from the services are channeled through the ministry of defence; neither the service chiefs nor the Chairman Chief’s of Staff Committee are members of the CCS, although service chiefs may be called for consultations, like many others.
A National Security Council (NSC) was created in 1999. A National Security Advisor (NSA) was also appointed. We have had three incumbents so far for this appointment – two were retired diplomats and the third is a retired intelligence specialist. The NSA has a secretariat, which is headed by a Deputy NSA. This appointment too has been held by retired diplomats so far. As far as the secretariat is concerned, officers of various ranks hold senior, middle level and junior staff appointments, but the military is represented only by a handful of junior officers. An ironical state of affairs, indeed!
Within the Ministry of Defence, there is neither integration, nor any methodology for analysing issues jointly. The Ministry of Defence asks service headquarters individually or jointly to submit their views on issues, whether they are on operational, intelligence or administrative matters or relating to personnel, and thereafter the Ministry deliberates on them, despite having little or no competence to analyse such military matters.
A similar situation prevails within service headquarters, wherein the stance of a particular service on an issue is first finalised in-house, including by obtaining inputs from their respective commands. Thereafter, it is forwarded to the Chief of Staff Committee for consideration. The Committee comprises the three service chiefs, with the seniormost being the Chairman. Such a structure and such formulations cannot hope to deliberate on issues objectively, as service biases are foremost in each member’s mind.
Since last year, the service headquarters have started calling themselves as Integrated Headquarters. It is a meaningless exercise in semantics, as there is hardly any integration of the three services, let alone with the ministry of defence. Even the establishment of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) continues to remain unimplemented.
Global and Regional Security Environment
The global security environment will continue to be influenced by the unilateralism of the sole super power, the USA; the growing potential of regional powers, particularly China; fundamentalism and terrorism; and the internal upheavals in many developing countries.
The 21st Century had opened with the global environment focused more on economic issues and multilateral and bilateral cooperation amongst nations. However, after the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), security issues have re-emerged and taken centre-stage. In addition to terrorism, the world continues to be plagued with conventional military threats, as well as non-military threats.
This state of affairs is likely to continue in the next two decades. The South Asian region is historically a conflict prone region, comprising post-colonial states, which have certain endemic vulnerabilities. Some of these are:
- Legacy of colonialism, the bloody Partition of India in 1947 and the break up of Pakistan in 1971.
- Tendency to dishonour treaties demarcating boundaries settled during the British Empire, and the use of military force to realign borders.
- The intolerant attitude of the super powers during the Cold War towards those states that sought to pursue independent policies.
- Discord amongst ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, resulting in internal turbulence.
- Uncontrolled population explosion, leading to poverty, illiteracy, disease, environmental degradation and unplanned urbanisation. This is compounded by demographic shifts, both within nations and across borders.
- Arms and drug trafficking, and a growing nexus between crime and politics.
- Develop as a fully secular, multi-cultural state, in which freedom of speech, thought and equal opportunity are available to all, regardless of race, religion, caste, community or sex.
- Ensure a secure and stable environment conducive to unhindered economic growth.
- Preserve and ensure the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of India.
- Contribute our share in international affairs, consistent with our policies.
- Deterring hostile neighbours possessing NBC weapons and missiles.
- Sub-national threats from hostile neighbours, including proxy war and terrorism.
- Operating under the aegis of the UN, other groupings, or even independently, in roles like peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or national reconstruction.
- Tackling overseas crises that threaten Indian citizens, property and interests.
- Domestic emergencies that exceed the capacity of other agencies like state governments, police forces or central agencies.
- The growing number of non-traditional threats will continue to increase, and I fear that the nation will continue to rely on the defence forces as the principal instrument to deal with them.
- The defence forces, as presently structured, may not be able to meet all the potential challenges ahead, which could span the entire spectrum of conflict.
- For meeting the challenges of the new century and adapt to the rapid development of new technologies, the defence forces have to change radically and become increasingly unified.
- The enormous human potential in the Army, its judicious harnessing, moulding it to exacting standards, providing it with special skills and injecting a high level of motivation, are also essential. Combat power is not simply the sum of machine performance. Machines can assist, but warfare will continue to be an intensely human activity.
- There is a definite need for better decision-making and the integration of all instruments of power (political, economic, military and informational) to tackle the multidimensional challenges ahead.
- Nuclear: We need to refine our nuclear doctrine, which should continue to be primarily for deterrence, but for use in case we are forced to use the nuclear option. Our retaliatory capability must be potent, comprehensive and timely. This entails, besides a range of warheads, the requisite delivery and support systems. We need to build up our current missile capability substantially, so that the army is equipped with a full range of missiles, capable of reaching all possible targets. It is important for India to continue to work towards a triad capability in the nuclear field. The military interface needs to be enhanced as it is currently less than desirable.
- Conventional: Credible conventional deterrence will continue to be important. The conventional capability of the defence forces must be comprehensive against our likely adversaries. The armed forces must maintain an effective superiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis Pakistan. They must also have the capability for punitive response to provocations short of war. The challenge China is expected to pose in the mid and long terms requires that our deterrence capability be upgraded, by adding a potent offensive capability to our current posture. In the maritime arena, we should have the capability to effectively guard our sea lanes of communications in the northern Indian Ocean region and protect our interests in the nation’s EEZ. The air force must be capable of creating a favourable air situation at least in specified corridors, which have a direct linkage to offensive operations of the ground forces. The air force must also create additional strategic lift capability for tasks within the country’s area of interest.
- Low Intensity Conflict (LIC): The LIC commitments of the defence forces, particularly the army, are likely to increase in the coming years, as there has been no improvement in the capabilities of the central police forces in tackling insurgency and terrorism, despite their increasing numerical strengths. The defence forces must be capable of fighting both internal insurgencies as well as those launched or supported by other countries or foreign entities. However, its conventional capability must not get diluted on account of excessive employment on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism roles. The army, particularly, must have adequate capability to fight high-grade insurgency in any part of India, including in our border states, as it is currently doing in Jammu and Kashmir. As both state and non-state actors are likely to resort to low intensity conflicts as their preferred mode of waging war, major restructuring may be required amongst the armed forces to meet this challenge. This may well imply a separate force, which must be equipped, manned and trained specifically for this role.
- Peacekeeping: The defence forces will have to play an enhanced role in peacekeeping operations, mostly under the aegis of the United Nations, but perhaps under other circ*mstances, too.
- Joint Endeavours: In all the above types of roles and operations, there would need to be a high level of jointness, otherwise the defence forces will not be able to achieve synergy and consequently the best results.
- 1. Indian Defence Year Book 2006: Ed. Lt Gen (Retd) RK Jasbir Singh, PVSM, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun 248001, India, ISBN 81- 86857-10-9, p. 228.
- 2. Ibid, pp. 230-231.
- 3. Ibid. pp. 232-233
- 4. Ibid. p. 234.
- 5. Vijay Oberoi, “Emerging Strategic Balance in Asia”, Paper presented at the seminar titled “Strategy” organised by the Hellenic Institute of Strategic Studies, Athens, Greece, 2005.
- 6. Vijay Oberoi, “Approach Paper Army 2020; Shape, Size, Structure and General Doctrine for Emerging Challenges; Army 2020,“Ed. Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, Knowledge World, New Delhi, India, 2005, pp. 14.
- 7. Vijay Oberoi, “Emerging Strategic Balance in Asia and A Perspective of India’s Land Forces”, Paper presented at the Chief of Army’s Conference titled “Facing Complexity: New Dimensions in Warfare and Strategy in the 21st Century”, at Canberra, Australia, September 2005.
- 8. Vijay Oberoi, “Global and Regional Military Environment”: “India’s National Security Annual Review 2003”, Ed. Satish Kumar, India Research Press, New Delhi, ISBN 81-87943-56-4, pp. 26.
- 9. Ibid, pp. 27.
- 10. Ibid. pp. 29.
- 11. Kip P. Nugren, “Emerging Technologies and Exponential Change: Implications for Army Transformation”, Parameters, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 86-89.
- 12. Vijay Oberoi, “Global and Regional Military Environment,” pp. 27. Ambassador Tayyab Siddiqui, “The Emerging Profile of India”, Internet.
- 13. Ibid, pp. 29.
- 14. Vijay Oberoi, Army 2020, pp.15.
- 15. Ibid, pp.15.
The security environment in South Asia continues to be influenced by historical disputes; nuclearisation; paucity of energy sources; inadequate harnessing of the abundant water resources; the growing potential of China; the war on terrorism; the spread of fundamentalism; and the social upheaval in practically all countries, due to the rising expectations of their people.5 The scenario is further complicated by a rise in trans-border terrorism, sponsored ethnic strife, and low intensity conflicts.6 The impact of the unilateralism of the sole super power, the USA, over events and policies in Asia, must also be factored in. All this is against the backdrop of vastly increased economic activity, globalisation and the great potential of the information revolution, which is making steady inroads into every facet of life.
India and Pakistan are the two nuclear states in South Asia, in addition to China, an earlier nuclear weapons power. The risk of a nuclear war in the region stands greatly reduced, but the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles is of grave concern, particularly when the countries involved are those which are prone to be influenced by terrorist activities, or have a history of promoting terrorists, either as state policy, or by ignoring the rise of religious fundamentalism in their countries, for various reasons. The revelations of major proliferation activities by Pakistan and North Korea are now history. Iran’s ambitions in the nuclear field are a major cause for concern. The obvious conclusions are that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has not worked and perhaps an entirely new dispensation is needed to control the spread of nuclear weapons. As long as blatant acts of major proliferation, like those of Pakistan and North Korea, are glossed over by the major powers, especially by the United States, on account of their short-term gains, many new aspirants will attempt to go nuclear.7
On the conventional plane, while limited conventional conflicts are still likely to occur, they are gradually giving way to conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. However, the proliferation of conventional weaponry and the transfer of weapons and equipment by China to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, as also other countries on India’s periphery, have adversely affected the South Asian regional military balance.
Threats and Challenges
India’s sphere of influence needs to encompass not just the South Asian Sub-continent, but also the northern Indian Ocean area, from the eastern seaboard of Africa in the west, to the Malacca Straits in the east, and must include Iran, Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), China and Myanmar. India’s credibility, as a regional power will be contingent upon institutional stability, economic development and military strength, including nuclear deterrence.
The long stretches of disputed borders with China and Pakistan and sizeable areas under their illegal occupation continue to be major irritants, notwithstanding the peace processes currently underway with both countries. These are unlikely to be resolved in the short term and will continue to generate tensions and instability at periodic intervals. Our vast island territories also need to be guarded.
Many of India’s external challenges are related to its extensive land and sea frontiers. The land frontiers exceed 15,000 km, covering seven neighbouring countries. The border in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is perpetually volatile, except when a mutually agreed cease-fire is in force, as it is at present. Pakistan is in adverse possession of large areas of this Indian State. An on-going peace process between India and Pakistan continues, and there are many positive fallouts of this process, but unless Pakistan stops the infiltration of insurgents and terrorists into Jammu & Kashmir, substantive improvement is unlikely.
India has a disputed border with China, too. China continues to be in adverse possession of 40,000 sq km of Indian Territory. A dialogue to resolve various issues between India and China is currently in progress, albeit at a slow pace. India-China relations have improved in recent years. A “Peace and Tranquillity” treaty is in place. The momentum towards confidence building and improved relations is continuing. There are no major disputes with India’s other neighbours, but the borders are extensive and somewhat porous.
The long coastline (7683 km), the island territories off both coasts, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over two million square kilometres all add up to various types of challenges. For example, the island territories to the east, i.e. the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands, are 1300 kilometres from the Indian mainland, but only 150 kilometres from Indonesia, 500 odd kilometres from Malaysia and Thailand, 250 kilometres from Myanmar and 400 kilometres from Bangladesh.
The time has come for India to look outwards. There are many tasks and contingencies outside our frontiers. These include coming to the assistance of our neighbours; rescuing or assisting Indian nationals abroad; safeguarding our vital economic or other interests; rendering aid during natural or other calamities; forming part of a multi-national force; and so on. For these challenges, we do need to have a state-of-the-art tri-service trans-national capability. This does not mean we have designs on other countries or that we are now becoming hegemons.
The escalating world oil prices have enhanced our energy crisis. Currently, India is the world’s sixth largest energy consumer and in 2010 we will hit the fourth place. We have made heavy investments abroad in the oil sector. These include long term contracts for oil and gas supply, on-going negotiations for participation in pipeline projects, as well as energy projects involving exploration, development, transportation and refining of hydrocarbons to meet our future needs. These investments, in locations as far a field as the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, need to be safeguarded against any unforeseen eventualities.
The next security challenge is the state of our neighbours. The political and economic status of most of our neighbours is a cause of major concern, as any major upheavals will pose great security and economic challenges for us. In addition, the governing elite in these countries tend to blame India for all their ills. It is no doubt a political ploy that works domestically. We need to take initiatives at many levels, including at the military level, to allay their imagined and real fears, so that our relations with our neighbours can be brought to an even keel.
As far as the maritime dimension is concerned, the littorals of the Indian Ocean and the island nations are both important. We cannot have any hostile or inimical powers threatening them. These countries need to be given assistance in terms of military hardware, training or technical assistance and sometimes assistance in policing their waters or airspace.
The on-going and future threats from terrorism, insurgencies and resorts to mindless violence to meet political ends are other major challenges. These may well be the most important and biggest security challenges of the future.
We are a responsible nuclear weapon state, which entails the efficient management of this deterrent capability. For deterrence to be successful, the adversary must be convinced of the severity of our retaliation. In addition, we must ensure that our second strike capability is not only well protected, but that it is also overwhelmingly devastating.
The last challenge is to transform the defence forces into a lean, technology intensive, networked and joint entity. It sounds simple, but considering our historical baggage and a penchant for the status quo, it would be a difficult proposition. We also need to function in a holistic manner, where security, foreign and economic policies must be integrated. At present, we are unfortunately functioning in separate compartments.
National Aspirations and Desired Capabilities
India’s primary strategic priority and goal remains the rapid socio-economic development of its people. Our national objectives may be summarised as under:
To attain the above objectives, India needs to ensure a secure external and internal security environment. The defence forces of India, as the ultimate instrument of the state, are responsible for safeguarding the core values and national interests from external aggression and internal subversion.
Our objectives also need to have an ideological component and reflect the inner urges of the people. Keeping all these aspects in mind, our national policy could be stated as: “To establish a strong, economically vibrant and united democratic India, free from internal and external threats, enjoying a prominent status in the region and having its rightful and honoured place in the world.”
India aspires to be recognised as an economic and military power of some reckoning, with a permanent membership of the UN Security Council. To achieve these objectives, India needs to ensure a peaceful internal environment, security from external threats and capability to project power in the greater South Asian region. Such an aspiration requires India to modernise its defence forces and equip them with contemporary techno-equipment to meet the expanded roles they would need to perform, while ensuring sustained economic growth and development.
Environmental Changes Affecting Military Operations
Globalisation has had a profound effect in making the world smaller and more accessible, but it has also had a major effect on the security environment. While military force factors continue to retain their significance in international relations, economic, political, technological, ecological, information and energy factors are also playing an increasingly dominant role in the shaping of the security environment.8 The regional military environment in South Asia is affected by on-going conflicts; proliferation and transfer of weapons; advancements in military technology; and the changing nature of war. These are elaborated in succeeding paragraphs.
Conflicts have continued in varying intensities in South Asia. Most of these conflicts have a historical baggage, with solutions so intractable that they linger despite many changes in the regional and national environments. Like volcanoes, they erupt once in a while and then lie dormant, but festering within, till another catalyst causes yet another eruption.9
The notable conflicts in South Asia are the India-Pakistan adversarial relationship; the India-China border stand-off; and internal conflicts generated by a section of the people, like the LTTE problem in Sri Lanka, the Maoists’ continuing struggle for power in Nepal, insurgencies and rebellions in Pakistan and a number of insurgencies in India.
In the last two decades, China’s export of high-grade steel, navigational guidance systems and missile technologies to Pakistan had enabled it to arm itself with nuclear weapons, with matching delivery capabilities. In turn, Pakistan used this clandestinely acquired capability to proliferate it to North Korea in return for missiles and missile technology, in some kind of a barter deal.
A similar situation obtains in the conventional arena. The accelerating recourse to conventional weapons proliferation in recent years has enabled many countries to possess high technology weapons at low costs. This has serious implications for regional security. Besides Pakistan, China has also provided conventional weaponry to Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal, to name only a few countries. These actions have tended to alter the regional military balance.
Rapid advancements in technology, in the fields of information, nuclear energy, biotechnology, aviation, space and underwater operations, are changing the concept of warfare. Capabilities for all weather surveillance, night vision devices, and extensive use of satellites and multiplicity of sensors have also affected all types of operations. In the field of information technology (IT), digitisation, networked communications, electronic warfare, as well as information warfare (IW), have highlighted the importance of systems integration. This has led to the concept of system of systems, which is a complete architecture of detection, selection, display, targeting and attack.10
RMA, which is manifested by high technology weapons, sensors, communications and information technology, will increasingly have an impact on all types of military operations. Warfare in the information age, irrespective of whether it is nuclear, conventional or low intensity in nature, will require highly complex planning and coordination, near real time and total situational awareness, decision support systems and massive data-base and information-exchange capabilities to tackle both friendly and inimical situations. Technology has made information more readily available, and it has now become a weapon of choice. The armed forces of India need to focus on IT and Information Warfare (IW) in a big way in the coming years and decades.
The continuing wave of technological change is different, in two ways, from even the IT revolution of the 1990s. First, it is a vastly more profound transformation, due to the synergy of three emerging technologies, viz. bioengineering, nano-engineering, and robotics and artificial intelligence. Secondly, it is a revolution that will occur at a speed never seen before. Observations of change over the past century indicate that technology is evolving exponentially, which means change is accelerating or the rate of change is increasing.11 The proliferation of all types of missiles; the versatility of modern aviation platforms; the precision guided and terminally guided munitions (PGMs and TGMs); and multi-dimensional manoeuvre vehicles are some of the breakthrough technologies which have changed the nature of warfare.
Missile Defence (MD), whether national missile defence (NMD) or theatre missile defence (TMD), is another technological advancement which will have a major effect on warfare in future. At present, in this region, only India in South Asia and China further afield, are examining it with some seriousness. MD is a strategic shift of major importance – from a doctrine of deterrence to that of interdictory interception. MD is already vehemently opposed by China, whose response may well be a further up-gradation of its strategic nuclear forces. This is likely to have a ripple effect in many parts of the world, including in South Asia, particularly India.12.
The proliferation of Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) weapons, smart weapons, imaginative employment of IT, more lethal and precise weapons, the fielding of many types of missiles and major up-gradation of aviation assets, all have made substantive changes to the concepts and methodologies of waging war. Asymmetric Warfare, for example, focuses on fighting a stronger enemy and still winning. In the same context, non-nuclear deterrence, which is aimed at deterring regional conflicts with only conventional weapons, continues to be important.
Operations in the future may not be easily divided into conventional and low intensity conflicts13.13 The modern battlefield will be characterised by short, intense operations, against a nuclear backdrop. There will be a large number of short, swift, and lethal engagements, using precision weapons, with heavy attrition, but with minimum collateral damage. Wars will be fought in all six dimensions – space, cyber, air, land, sea and sub-surface. Increased use of various types of sensors will bring total transparency to the battlefield. This will affect the achievement of surprise, both strategic and tactical, and there would be an overload of information at the command posts.
In conventional operations, front, depth and rear areas would be engaged simultaneously with real time surveillance, integrated Command Control Communication Computers Intelligence Interoperability (C4 I2 ), target acquisition and highly lethal precision weapons systems. The battlefield will become more digitised, more transparent and would experience a major increase in deployment of electronic devices, signalling the growing primacy of the electromagnetic spectrum14.14 Escalation will have to be carefully controlled to ensure that no nuclear red lines are crossed. Despite this constraint, sufficient space for conventional operations will continue to be available. The ability of ground forces will depend upon the speed with which they can move, concentrate and regroup rapidly over any type of terrain.
Today, joint and combined operations are the norm. IT, in all its manifestations, affects decision-making. At the same time, IW, including the creation of a favourable public opinion, is a necessary adjunct to the higher direction of war. Military planners will need to give considerable thought to the likelihood of terrorist threats, along with fighting conventional operations. Resultantly, greater number of troops and equipment would be required to cope with such threats.15
Future Role: Defence Forces of India
In the coming decades, the role of the defence forces will continue to be “to preserve national interests and safeguard territorial integrity and unity of the country, against any external or internal threats, by deterrence or by waging a war”.
The defence forces have to deal with both traditional missions of deterrence and war fighting, as well as non-traditional missions. They also play an important role in nation building. The missions of the defence forces can be listed as under:
Excessive involvement of the defence forces, particularly the army, in internal security duties adversely affects their combat potential. Continued deployment on such duties also tends to alienate the populace and tarnishes the image of the defence forces. These are difficult operations, as their resolution essentially lies in the political domain and the army has to operate under a number of constraints. Therefore, over-exposure in internal security duties is counter-productive, especially when their employment on such duties is for a prolonged period.
Although there has been an exponential growth of many types of police forces in our country, they are currently incapable, or unwilling, or both, to tackle insurgencies. Consequently, I foresee that the defence forces, primarily the Army, will continue to be called out to tackle insurgencies, terrorism, proxy wars and even high-grade internal security situations.
India’s military strategy has to be effective across the entire spectrum of possible conflicts. Increased focus on information technology and information warfare is also essential. The army particularly needs to transit from manpower orientation to high technology, tempering it with the knowledge that sub-conventional operations are manpower intensive.
India’s aspirations for peace and security require the modernisation of the defence forces, restructuring them and equipping them with contemporary technological equipment. The restructuring should be such that the military continues to remain professionally strong. Restructuring includes optimisation of doctrine and concepts, restructuring of the field force, efficient management of internal conflicts, upgrading human resources, streamlining logistics and modernising the training methodology of the military.
At the upper end of the conflict spectrum, only nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons. However, at the conventional level, the need is to build a capability for small-size operations, which are executed swiftly. At the sub-conventional level, the approach should be multi-faceted, with the military part being pro-active. Special Forces would play an extremely important role in such operations.
In the coming decades of the 21st Century, our defence forces need to address the following:
Jointmanship
Modern War cannot be fought with outdated structures, wherein the army, the navy and the air force conduct operations independently, with coordination only being achieved with organisations as old as nearly seven-eight decades back. War is a joint endeavour, wherein the entire nation has to gear up for fighting it. Today, this truism is even more relevant, because waging war today is a complex phenomenon. This complexity is likely to increase in the future. The reasons include high technology, the nature of modern war, new threats and challenges and the reality of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of our potential adversaries. Consequently, a joint force, which acts in an integrated manner, is not just desirable but an imperative. Gone are the days when individual services, like the army or navy, fought wars on their own.
Most professional militaries have adopted jointmanship, not merely in their organisations and structures, but in their very approach to tackling military problems, big or small. Unfortunately, the Indian military is an exception amongst the more professional militaries. While everyone who matters endorses the need for joint endeavours, it eventually turns out to be merely lip service. This must change, for if we continue in this mode, we will be unable to generate the necessary synergy, so essential for winning conflicts, battles and wars.
The Indian military had realised the importance of jointmanship soon after our Independence. This vision was translated into reality by the setting up of joint institutions like the National Defence Academy (NDA), the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and the National Defence College (NDC). These institutions, all joint, covered a wide canvas, from pre-commissioning training to the highest level of formal training an officer undergoes. Unfortunately, somewhere along the way, we lost our focus and drifted into separate entities, which became institutionalised over time.
The wars we fought since our Independence added to this “lone ranger” syndrome. Our first war, in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48, was essentially an army affair, with some support from the air force. The navy was not involved. In 1962, when China attacked us, the army again operated alone, as it was decided not to employ the air force. Once again there was no role for the navy. The next war, against Pakistan in 1965, saw all the three services fighting the enemy, but mostly independently, although the army and the air force did carry out coordination in specific operations.
It was only in the 1971 war that the three services were employed synergistically and won the war decisively. Synergy during this war was achieved largely because of the personalities of the dramatis personae and the nearly nine month long planning and preparation time available and not because of any structural or organisational changes. Unfortunately, the example of the 1971 war continues to be quoted by those opposed to greater jointmanship, on the specious plea that since the structures worked during 1971, there was no need for instituting reforms now! This is of course absurd logic, considering that nearly four decades have passed since then. The entire nature of war has changed now and there is no surety that the personal chemistry of the new actors would again work positively.
Besides the above mentioned conflicts, the army has also been involved, almost continuously, in fighting different types of insurgencies and terrorism in various parts of the country. The nature of these operations does not need the navy and the air force to step in. So essentially, it is again the army operating on its own. This had its repercussions during the Kargil conflict in 1999, when initially the air force refused to participate, on the plea that it would escalate the conflict. When they did come in later, it took time to build up the necessary synergy. It is apparent that our experiences post-Independence lulled us into a state of complacency and we made little effort to forge joint concepts, structures and institutions, thus obtaining less than optimal results.
A major recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee set up after the Kargil conflict to recommend reforms, including in the higher defence structure, was the need to set up joint structures at the earliest. The GoM eventually accepted the recommendations, after some changes and implementation instructions were issued in mid-2001. While an integrated defence headquarters and two joint commands have been formed, a key recommendation, i.e. the establishment of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), remains unimplemented. Resultantly, the integrated headquarters gets its directions from the ineffective Chiefs of Staff Committee, an organisation which has neither the teeth nor the inclination to take any strong and meaningful decisions, including in the realm of jointmanship. Unfortunately, this state of affairs suits the principal actors, viz. the political leadership which continues to be bugged by the non-existent spectre of a military takeover, however preposterous it may sound; the bureaucracy, who see the CDS as threatening their overlordship over of the service headquarters; and even the service headquarters, who are highly reluctant to part with any power which will dilute their fiefdoms.
The service headquarters may not want to dilute any of their powers, but at least two out of three used to speak in favour of jointness. Now, nearly six years after the GoM had given their directions, even that has changed. Apparently, none of them are now interested in the appointment of a CDS. There is no discernable change in the stance of the political leadership as well as the bureaucracy. So we flounder along, believing in our fatalistic fashion that everything will turn out right in the end and through some sleight of hand the Indian military will, for the umpteenth time, again pull the chestnuts out of the fire, as it always has when the chips are down! The moot question is, should policies of such great importance, relating to the security and indeed the very existence of our nation, continue to be sacrificed at the altar of expediency or sloth or indifference, or all three?
Transformation
There is a need to transform our military in a deliberate manner. The transformation must be major in scope. This can only be done if sufficient resources are made available. For this, the armed forces have to convince the political leadership, as well as the people, of the legitimacy of their needs. Defence allocations continue to be meagre, at less than 2.5 per cent of the GDP. Our decision-making systems and processes are also slow. These need to change.
The transformation should begin with the development of a realistic strategic direction. The national strategy must clearly spell out interests, goals, priorities, and resource allocations. From this, a national military strategy should be evolved. This, in turn, will enable the military to decide on the details of restructuring, hopefully without the influences of service bias or sentimentality. Some assets will have to be phased out over time, as new, innovative systems come on line through the process of transformation.
The process of change must be extensive and should also include a review of our personnel system. We need to produce junior leaders with broader and more sophisticated educational and service experience. Quality-of-life areas, compensation, benefits, personal development, challenging experiences, and personnel stability have to be major considerations in getting and keeping the best and brightest our society has to offer. The future military will be an even more complex institution and will require truly competent and dedicated members.
We must seriously address joint warfare. The Services must eliminate the inter-service bickering that continues to be the bane of the defence forces. At the apex level, our structures for the management of higher defence and the systems for providing military advice, as well as recommendations for national security policy, also need to be re-examined. The CDS must be appointed without any delay and additional joint commands must be set up. While the eventual structures we should aim at must be integrated commands, this should come about in an evolutionary manner. The appointing of a CDS and gradual addition of new joint commands will, over a period of time, suggest the numbers and types of joint commands we need. For the next few years, we may leave operational commands as they are at present, except that the jointness amongst them must be substantially increased. There are other areas like Special Forces, Space, Training, Communications, Logistics and so on, which lend themselves for restructuring into joint commands
Within the army, having two sets of forces, a small-sized traditional army for deterrence and waging war and a much larger, lightly equipped internal security force (ISF) for combating low intensity conflicts is perhaps one answer for restructuring. In the Navy, while the enhancing of blue water capability must continue, some focus will have to shift to counter terrorism and militancy at sea, including greater control of coastal waters and our EEZ. Till now, the role of the Air Force in counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations has been confined to air transportation. This would need to change. Future low intensity threats would require the fielding of air power. Whether this takes the form of restructuring a part of the air force or enhancing army aviation assets so that they can take on these roles, can be debated, but the latter has obvious operational advantages. Major reforms and restructuring would be required for this, which would be opposed by large numbers, both within and outside the services.
In sum, the force structure of the defence forces of India should be such that it is able to achieve the objectives the nation expects from it. We need to be regional players of eminence, as well as have a say in global strategic formulations. The capabilities of the armed forces, therefore, must include the following:
Conclusion
Today, the defence forces of India are at the crossroads of a revolutionary change, marked by nuclearisation of the subcontinent, asymmetric threats like the on-going proxy war in Kashmir, our rapidly increasing interests within the region, military aspects of globalisation and rapid technological changes. In this new milieu, the defence forces must not only retain a combat edge in conventional operations, but also handle sub-conventional challenges effectively.
Focus on LIC operations must not distract the defence forces from other roles. We need to look at the totality of roles, which the military would need to perform. Deterrence is an essential element in all the roles of the military, whether they are in the conventional, non-conventional or sub-conventional arenas.
Change is no doubt difficult, as we are highly conservative. The bureaucracy, both civil and military, and the political leadership with vested interests in preserving the status quo, will resist change or will support only marginal changes. This will further complicate implementation of the needed reforms.
India is now genuinely poised to shine. It cannot do so with a feeble military machine, which functions on ad hoc basis or on the glorious past. We need to revamp and restructure before we are actually faced with the challenges we have talked about. The need today is for a synergistic and visionary national approach for the strong, purposeful and modern India that is just over the horizon.
Notes
